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I ABSTRACT 
Until Commissioner of Inland Revenue v BNZ Investments Ltd ( 'BNZI') 
the concept of an 'arrangement' found in New Zealand's general anti-
avoidance provision ('GAP'), although integral to the operation of the 
provision, had rarely been subject to judicial consideration. This paper 
outlines the decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal in BNZI 
which held that, unless a taxpayer is consciously involved in or had a 
meeting of minds in relation to a tax avoidance transaction, there is no 
arrangement and the GAP can not be applied against the taxpayer even 
though they obtain a tax advantage from the tax avoidance. 
This paper considers the concept of an arrangement and the 
definition of it found in the New Zealand GAP. In doing so it suggests 
that it might have been possible for the courts in BNZI to identify an 
arrangement which encompassed within its scope the redeemable 
preference share transactions to which BNZI were a party. While 
accepting that an arrangement may exist where there is a meeting of the 
minds, this paper goes on to question the fundamental assumption of the 
High Court and the majority of the Court of Appeal that the taxpayer 
against whom the GAP is applied must be part of that consensus. 
Having concluded that the requirement of taxpayer knowledge or 
participation in the arrangement is an unwarranted requirement, the 
paper suggests an alternative application of New Zealand's GAP more 
consistent with the conclusions reached, based on its discussion of the 
law surrounding both the New Zealand GAP and similar international 
GAPs. The discussion of this alternative application demonstrates that 
it was unnecessary and undesirable for the courts to incorporate a 
requirement of taxpayer involvement as a matter of law before there can 
be an arrangement under New Zealand's GAP. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 15,000 words. 
4 
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II INTRODUCTION 
In Commissioner of Inland Revenue v ENZ Investments Ltd ('BNZI') the 
Court of Appeal considered the scope of section 99, the general anti-
avoidance provision in the Income Tax Act 1976. The decision 
addresses the important issue of the extent to which the anti-avoidance 
provision can be extended to catch taxpayers who have limited 
knowledge and involvement in a tax avoidance arrangement, but who 
nevertheless benefit significantly from it. 
In BNZI, both the Court of Appeal and the High Court focused 
their attention on whether there was an arrangement to which section 99 
could apply. In doing so they held that, unless a taxpayer has conscious 
involvement or is involved in a consensus as to the tax avoidance 
transactions, section 99 cannot apply to them. 
This paper will examine the concept of an arrangement, and the 
approaches of the courts generally to defining and identifying 
arrangements. It will question the approach of the courts in BNZI to the 
arrangement issue, in particular their focus on BNZI's level of 
involvement in the arrangement. An alternative approach to the 
application of section 99 will be suggested, the focus of which is the 
arrangement and its effect, rather than the knowledge or involvement of 
a particular taxpayer. Under the rationale of the courts in BNZI, such an 
approach would be flawed by virtue of its applicability to innocent 
taxpayers. The perceived shortcomings of this alternative approach will 
be explored, and it will be demonstrated that even if the criticisms of the 
approach are accepted, they are not insurn1ountable, thereby rendering it 
a preferable approach to that adopted by the courts in BNZJ. 
III THE PROBLEM 
A Facts of the BNZI Case 
The facts of the BNZI case are complex. Essentially a dispute arose 
with regard to income tax assessments issued by the Commissioner in 
relation to a series of redeemable preference share ('RPS ') investments 
5 
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made by BNZ Investments ('BNZI') in entities provided by Capital 
Markets Limited ('CML'), a member of the Fay Richwhite Group. 
Substantial sums were involved with additional tax of $44 million at 
stake. 
RPS financing was relatively common in the late 1980s and carried 
with it tax advantages over conventional lending. Funds could be 
bonowed to invest in RPS and the interest on such borrowings was 
deductible. Dividends on RPS were tax exempt under the inter-
company dividend exemption of the time. In addition, where the RPS 
issuer had losses to use, or had earned exempt income the fact that 
dividends were not deductible to them was not significant. 
Funds invested by BNZI with CML were deposited with offshore 
banks through a series of complicated transactions involving a number 
of entities, some of which were located in tax havens. There were two 
types of transactions, the MCN transactions, which involved mandatory 
conve1iible notes, and the Alasdair/Fenstanton transactions, which 
involved section 195 1 debentures. These complex transactions took 
advantage of the tax laws at the time and the interest income from 
offshore banks was ultimately repatriated to BNZI in a tax exempt form. 
BNZI and Fay Richwhite had a relatively close working relationship, 
however BNZI had limited knowledge as to the use of the funds that 
they had invested with CML. Although BNZI made no formal enquiries 
as to the use of the funds, they had proceeded on the assumption that 
CML would utilise tax losses to shelter profits. Nevertheless, BNZI had 
seen fit to take tax indemnities against CML, as was routine in RPS 
transactions of the time. 
1 Now Income Tax Act 1994, s FC 2. 
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IV BNZI - THE HIGH COURT DECISION 
A The Parties' Main Contentions 
1. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
The Commissioner sought to use section 99 to counter the tax advantage 
received by BNZI on the grounds that: 
1. the RPS transactions were part of an arrangement which directly or 
indirectly had more than an incidental purpose or effect of tax 
avoidance; or 
2. whether or not the RPS transactions were part of a void 
arrangement, BNZI was affected by a void arrangement; and 
3. BNZI had obtained a tax advantage from or under that arrangement. 2 
2. BNZ Investments Ltd 
BNZI divided the transactions into separate 'upstream' and 
'downstream' transactions, the dividing point being at CML. 
Upstream transactions 
Downstream transactions 
Other 
entities 
BNZI's contentions of most relevance for the purposes of this 
paper were that section 99 could not be applied to treat the dividends as 
assessable to them on the grounds that: 
2 BNZ Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2000) 19 NZTC 15,732, 
15,778-15,779 (HC). 
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1. BNZI had only entered into the upstream transactions which were 
the relevant 'arrangement' for the purposes of considering the 
application of section 99 to them, and which did not have tax 
avoidance as more than an incidental purpose and effect; or 
2. If the upstream and downstream transactions could be classified as 
the relevant 'arrangement', such arrangement did not have tax 
avoidance as more than an incidental purpose and effect. 3 
B The Issues and the Approach of the High Court 
1. One 'arrangement' under section 99? 
a) The parties ' main contentions 
Justice McGechan adopted BNZI's formulation of the issues and 
considered first whether the Commissioner was entitled to classify the 
upstream and downstream transactions as one arrangement for the 
purposes of section 99(1 ). 
BNZI asserted that there was "no justification in law or in fact for 
classifying the upstream and downstream transactions as one 
'arrangement' . "4 Central to this assertion was their contention that an 
'arrangement' within section 99 must have an element of 'mutuality' 
which, they said, implied the requirement of the taxpayer having 
positive and knowing involvement.5 They said in this case there was no 
mutuality affecting BNZI beyond the upstream RPS structure. 6 
Fmihennore they argued that knowledge was not sufficient, mutuality 
required more. 7 
The Commissioner had classified the upstream and downstream 
arrangements as one, on the basis that the transactions were not 
conceptually capable of division and that to do so would "deny their 
3 BNZI v CIR, above, 15,779 (HC) . 
4 
BNZlv CIR, above, 15,783 (HC) McGechan J. 
5 BNZI v CIR, above, 15,783 (HC) McGechan J. 
6 BNZ! v CIR, above, 15,784 (HC) McGechan J. 
7 
BNZI v CIR, above, 15,784 (HC) McGechan J. 
8 
LAWS 516 The Scope and Effect of Section 99 Ross Nelson 
economic integration and allow form to override substance. "8 The 
Commissioner did not accept that mutuality was required. He set out 
four alternative policy options in approaching the definition of an 
arrangement which would implicate the taxpayer in an arrangement 
based on varying degrees of notice or knowledge of a risk of, or actual 
tax avoidance. Finally he argued that even if mutuality was required 
BNZI advanced their money on the understanding that tax minimisation 
would be achieved and that there was mutuality in that respect, BNZI 
being ignorant only in respect of the detail.9 
Justice McGechan preferred the view of BNZI that the 
arrangements could not be said to be one arrangement and held that 
mutuality is required before it can be said that a taxpayer is party to an 
'arrangement",'~ although he added that 'tacit involvement' would also 
suffice." He said that "to 'know' is not necessarily to 'arrange' ... 
[m]ore is required." 12 Whether there was tacit involvement, he said was 
to be detem1ined objectively, and might occur where, for example: 
factual matters point to an inter-connected downstream scheme 
at risk of avoidance under section 99 and the downstream 
counterparty is justified in assuming the taxpayer is aware of and 
comfortable with this risk; or 
a taxpayer is wilfully blind to this risk; or 
a taxpayer suspects or knows such downstream activities will 
occur and proceeds nevertheless with upstream activities. 13 
He went on to decide that on the facts, BNZI had neither the required 
conscious nor tacit involvement and that they regarded this as a standard 
transaction which would fall outside section 99. 14 
8 BNZ!v CIR, above, 15 ,779-15 ,780 (HC) McGechan J. 
9 
BNZI v CIR, above, 15 ,786 (HC) McGechan J. 
10 BNZI v CIR, above, 15 ,791 (HC) McGechan J. 
11 
BNZI v CIR, above, 15 ,791 (HC) McGechan J. 
I? - BNZI v CIR, above, 15,791 (HC) McGechan J. 
13 BNZI v CIR, above, 15,791 (HC) McGechan J. 
14 BNZI v CIR, above, 15 ,793 (HC) McGechan J. 
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b) Tax avoidance in downstream arrangements 
Although he had found that section 99 could not apply to BNZI, Justice 
McGechan went on to consider the issue of whether there was tax 
avoidance in the downstream arrangements. While the focus of this 
paper is on the High Court's approach to the 'arrangement' issue, two of 
the findings under the 'tax avoidance' issue are worth noting. 
The High Court determined that had there been 'one arrangement', 
the Alasdair/Fenstanton transactions would have been tax avoidance 
arrangements to which section 99(2) would apply. 15 Second, the High 
Court said that, in the event of such a finding, BNZI would also be said 
to have received an indirect tax advantage capable of being countered 
by the Commissioner through the application of section 99(3). 16
 
V THE APPROACH OF THE COURT OF APPEAL 
A The Issues and Parties' Main Contentions 
The Commissioner appealed against the High Court's decision, and 
BNZI cross appealed against the Court's decision in relation to the tax 
avoidance purpose or effect. 
The Commissioner's arguments m the Court of Appeal were 
similar to those he made in the High Court. 17 He submitted that as 
interdependent transactions, including the sharing of tax advantages, the 
RPS deals were part of the arrangement within section 99. 
Alternatively, the Commissioner contended that if knowledge of how 
the tax advantage was to be obtained was required as part of the plan or 
understanding, BNZI, having left that part of the arrangement to CML 
must be taken to have authorised what was done. 18 
15 BNZI v CIR, above, 15,803 (HC) McGechan J. 
16 BNZI v CIR, above, 15,816 (HC) McGechan J. 
17 The main difference was that his submjssions implicating BNZI on the basis of 
notions of ' notice of tax avoidance ' were not advanced due to the High Court's finding 
of facts in respect of notice. 
18 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v BNZ Investments Ltd (200 I) 20 NZTC 17,103, 
17,114 (CA) Richardson P. 
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B The Majority and Justice Blanchard 
The majority in the Court of Appeal accepted the High Court's findings 
of facts and proceeded to consider the arrangement issue. 19 They held 
that an arrangement "involves a consensus, a meeting of minds between 
parties involving an expectation on the part of each that the other will 
act in a particular way."20 They said that the essential thread of the 
words in section 99(1) is mutuality and that there must be consensus as 
to what is to be done. The consensus, they said, to constitute an 
arrangement must encompass explicitly or implicitly the dimension 
which amounts to tax avoidance, although the taxpayer need not know 
that it is tax avoidance. 2 1 
It is not entirely clear what level of consensus the majority 
required the parties to have, although it appeared to be a relatively high 
threshold. Justice Blanchard in his separate judgment which was 
consistent with that of the majority, said that there must be "at least a 
broad appreciation of the character of what is occurring."22 
Applying that approach to the facts in BNZI, the majority held that 
there was no meeting of the minds between BNZI and CML as to what 
steps or activities the latter would undertake downstream.23 BNZI did 
not know the plan, and nor was there any basis upon which to say that 
they ought to have known of the tax avoidance. 24 There was, the Court 
held , therefore a natural divide between the upstream and downstream 
transactions. 25 
C Justice Thomas - Dissent 
Justice Thomas delivered a strong dissenting judgment that will 
probably be remembered more for his scathing criticism of the Privy 
19 CIR v BNZ! , above, 17,11 5 (CA) Richardson P. 
2° C !R v BNZ!, above, 17, 11 7 (CA) Richardson P. 
21 CIR v ENZ!, above, 17, 11 7 (CA) Richardson P. 
?2 
- CIR v ENZ!, above, 17,142 (CA) Blanchard J. 
23 CIR v BNZ!, above, 17,11 8 (CA) Richardson P. 
24 Cl R v BNZI, above, 17, 118 (CA) Richardson P. 
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Council and its influence in relation to the prevailing approach of form 
over substance in New Zealand than it will for his comments in relation 
to the issues of BNZI. The judgment is however noteworthy for the 
different approach Justice Thomas adopts to applying section 99. 
Adopting a purposive approach to interpreting section 99, three 
key factors drove the dissent of Justice Thomas. They were that: 
1. arrangement was to be given a wide meaning 
2. the scope and effect of an arrangement were to be determined 
objectively 
3. the innocence or ignorance of a participant in the arrangement 
does not exclude liability. 
He held that although BNZI were not consciously involved in the 
specific tax avoidance transaction, the RPS transaction was nevertheless 
part of the arrangement made or entered into for the purposes of section 
99. 26 There was, he said, agreement or understanding on the broad 
components of the transaction27 and that the ignorance or innocence of 
BNZI could not vary the arrangement's effect and should not entitle 
BNZI to take the tax advantage that they obtained from the tax 
avoidance arrangement. 28 
VI GROUNDS FOR CRITICISM AND COMMENT 
The decisions and reasoning of the courts in BNZI are interesting for a 
variety of reasons. Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal 
focused their decisions on the definition of an arrangement. In doing so, 
with the exception of Justice Thomas, they approached the question of 
whether it could be said that there was an arrangement on the basis of 
the underlying assumption that, for an arrangement to exist, it was 
necessary that BNZJbe in some way involved in that arrangement. 
25 CIR v BNZ!, above, 17, 11 8 (CA) Richardson P. 
26 
CIR v BNZI, above, 17,135 (CA) Thomas J dissenting. 
27 CIR v BNZI, above, 17,135-17,136 (CA) Thomas J dissenting. 
28 CIR v BNZ!, above, 17,139 (CA) Thomas J dissenting. 
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This section of the paper will consider the definition of an 
arrangement and the courts' approach to identifying an arrangement 
under section 99. In doing so, it will first proceed under the assumption 
that for section 99 to be applied to BNZI, an arrangement in which they 
were a 'participant' must be identified, an assumption broadly 
consistent with that of the High Court and the majority of the Court of 
Appeal. As BNZI clearly had significant involvement in the RPS 
transactions the paper will therefore discuss whether an arrangement 
encompassing both these and the downstream transactions may be 
identified. The paper will then however, go on to question and discuss 
the validity of reading into the definition of arrangement an element of 
taxpayer participation as the High Court and majority of the Court of 
Appeal did. 
A Definition of Arrangement 
The concept of an arrangement is integral to the operation of section 99. 
It is clear that in order for section 99 to apply there must be an 
' an-angement' .29 In addition, it is the an-angement identified against 
which the section 99(2) tax avoidance purpose or effect test is applied. 
It is useful therefore to consider the origins of the statutory definition of 
' an-angement' , its meaning and to discuss how an arrangement might be 
identified. 
I. History of section 99 
Section 99 has its origins in the Land Tax Act 1878 which voided, as 
between parties to them, "covenants or agreements" which purported to 
alter the incidence of land tax from the land owner to other persons, 
such as their tenants. 30 A number of similar provisions followed, the 
scope of which sometimes differed slightly,3 ' however it was not until 
29 BNZ investments Ltd v Commissioner of inland Revenue (2000) 19 NZTC 15,732 , 
15,787 (I-IC) McGechan J. 
30 Land Tax Act 1878, s 62 . 
3 1 For example the Property Assessment Act 1879 s 29 extended to any ' contract, 
covenant or agreement' . 
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the Land and Income Tax Assessment Act 1900 that the term 
'arrangement' on which the current New Zealand legislation hinges first 
appeared in a general anti-avoidance provision ('GAP'). 32 
2. Judicial consideration 
The tenn arrangement has been statutorily defined m New Zealand, 
however judicial discussion in relation to the meaning of 'arrangement' 
warrants consideration as it provides substantial insight into the 
meaning of the New Zealand definition. 
Historically the term 'arrangement' did not receive significant 
attention in the New Zealand courts. In fact there are few cases 
involving any of the New Zealand GAPs prior to the proliferation of 
cases in the early 1960s, which continued through the 1970s. 33 In early 
cases, as has been characteristic of the majority of subsequent cases, the 
focus of litigation was on whether an accepted contract, agreement or 
arrangement had the requisite tax avoidance purpose or effect. 
Similarly issues of knowledge and participation did not arise as early 
cases typically involved relatively simple arrangements designed to spilt 
income amongst family members. 34 However, while the New Zealand 
courts did not themselves grapple with the difficult issue of what 
constitutes an arrangement, they were prepared to adopt the approach of 
the Australian courts to the issue. 
32 Land and Income Tax Assessment Act 1900, s 82. The addition of the term 
arrangement was important, because as subsequent authorities have illustrated, often 
the New Zealand GAP has been invoked to counteract complex arrangements 
involving a number of steps and transactions which are more readily caught under the 
broad concept of an arrangement than previous more restrictive terms: see ICF Spry 
Section 260 of the Income Tax Assessment Act (2 ed, The Law Book Company Ltd, 
Melbourne, 1978) 4. 
33 The first reported case involving a ew Zealand GAP was Charles v Lysons [1922] 
ZLR 902 (CA). 
34 See for example Commissioner of inland Revenue v Brown [ 1962] NZLR 1091 
(SC). 
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a) Australian decisions 
In the past, Australia had GAPs similar to those found in New 
Zealand. 35 Justice Isaacs' judgment in Jaques v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation36 appears to be the first judicial discussion of what is meant 
by the term arrangement. He noted that: 37 
arrangement is no doubt an elastic word, and in some contexts may 
have a larger com1otation. But in this collocation it is the third in a 
descending series, and means an arrangement which is in the nature 
of a bargain but may not legally or formally amount to a contract or 
an agreement. 
Subsequent to this the High Court of Australia elaborated further on the 
meaning of arrangement in Bell v Federal Commissioner of Taxation. 38 
The Court said that: 39 
the word 'arrangement' is the third in a series which as regards 
comprehensiveness is an ascending series, and [the] word extends 
beyond contracts and agreements so as to embrace all kinds of 
concerted action by which persons may arrange their affairs for a 
particular purpose or so as to produce a particular effect. 
While these two cases provide an insight into the meamng the 
courts have given the term 'arrangement', it was in Newton v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation40, which followed them, that the term was 
most fully discussed. In that case Lord Denning made the following 
observations: 41 
35 See generally ICF Spry Section 260 of the Income Tax Assessment Act (2 ed, The 
Law Book Company Ltd, Melbourne, 1978) 1-9. 
36 (1924) 34 CLR 328 (HCA). 
37 Jaques v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1924) 34 CLR 328, 359 (HCA) Isaacs 
J. 
38 (1953) 87 CLR 548 (HCA). 
39 Bell v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1953) 87 CLR 548, 573 (HCA) Dixon CJ 
for the Court. Although at first glance the Court may seem to contradict Justice Isaacs 
by their statement that arrangement is the third in an ascending series, they referred to 
an ascending level of comprehensiveness, whereas Justice Isaacs was referring to a 
descending level of fo1mality . 
40 [1958] AC 450 (PC). 
41 Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1958] AC 450, 465 (PC) Lord 
Denning for the Cami. 
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the word 'arrangement' is apt to describe something less than a 
binding contract or agreement, something in the nature of an 
understanding between two or more persons - a plan arra.nged 
between them which may or may not be enforceable in law. But it 
must in this section comprehend, not only the initial plan but also all 
the transactions, that is, which have the effect of avoiding taxation. 
The approach taken in Newton was first adopted by a New Zealand 
court in Robertson v Inland Revenue Commissioner, 42 a case that 
involved the meaning of 'transaction'. The Newton approach later came 
to be referred to in GAP cases as early as 1962.43 
In 1974 the New Zealand GAP was redrafted m response to a 
number of factors, not least of which was the recommendation of a 
taxation review suggesting a clarification of its scope,44 the perceived 
need to strengthen the section in response to a number of technical 
arguments raised by taxpayers seeking to limit the scope of the section45 
and a growing level of judicial disquiet as to the section's unsatisfactory 
nature. 46 The redrafted section contained a definition of arrangement 
which encapsulated every element of Lord Denning's conceptualisation 
of an arrangement and read: 47 
"Arrangement" means any contract, agreement, plan or understanding 
(whether enforceable or unenforceable) including all steps and 
transactions by which it is carried into effect. 
Although the definition did not expressly include within its terms the 
word ' arrangement', it nevertheless represented a clear endorsement by 
42 
[ 19 59] NZLR 492, 499 (SC) McCarthy J ( as he then was) . 
43 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Brown [ 1962] NZLR 1091 , 1095 (SC). 
44 Taxation Review Conunittee Taxation in New Zealand - Report of the Taxation 
Review Committee (Government Printer, Wellington, 1967) 267. 
45 Hon WE Rowling (28 August 1974) 393 NZPD 4108. For a summary of the 
technical arguments raised and the courts responses to them see ILM Richardson "And 
Now the New Section 108" [1974] NZLJ 560, 562. 
46 See for example Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Gerard [1974] 2 NZLR 279, 
280 (CA) McCarthy P. 
47 Income Tax Act 1954, s 108. Later adopted in the Income Tax Act 1976, s 99 and 
now found in the Income Tax Act 1994, s OB 1. 
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the legislature of the adoption by the New Zealand courts of the Newton 
approach to the meaning of arrangement. 
3. What do the words mean? 
a) Contract, agreement, plan or understanding 
The background to the arrangement definition above suggests a number 
of things about its meaning. 'Contract' it seems is used in its ordinary 
sense, meaning a transaction involving a valid offer and acceptance 
leading to the assumption of legal obligations. 'Agreement' is capable 
of interpretation narrowly, to mean an agreement which alters the legal 
rights and obligations of parties to it, or broadly, to mean an agreement 
in fact not necessarily legally binding.
48 While it appears that Lord 
Denning in Newton used the tem1 in the narrow sense, the distinction is 
merely academic, as 'understanding' would clearly extend to 
agreements in the broader sense of the word in the event 'agreement' 
was to be read narrowly. 'Plan' is a tenn that taken on its own is of a 
slightly different nature from the terms that precede it. However the 
term should be read in context ejusdem generis and with Lord 
Dem1ing's words 'a plan arranged between them' in mind. It is 
submitted therefore that the word 'plan' does not detract from the 
validity of the consensus approach. 
49 
Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal acknowledged the 
definition of arrangement's origin in Newton.
50 Justice McGechan 
identified the terms in the definition as having one essential common 
factor of conscious involvement by the taxpayer. 
51 However, the 
context of Lord Denning's use of the words to expand on the meaning 
of arrangement does not suggest that he used them in any other sense 
48 ICF Spry Section 260 of the Income Tax Assessment Act (2 ed, The Law Book 
Company Ltd, Melbourne, 1978) 10-11. 
49 See also BNZ Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2000) 19 NZTC 
15,732, 15,787 (HC) McGechan J. 
so BNZ !,,vestments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2000) 19 NZTC 15,732 , 
15,787 (HC) McGechan J and Commissioner of Inland Revenue v BNZ Investments 
Ltr/(2001 ) 20 ZTC 17, 103, 17,116(CA)RichardsonP. 
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than their ordinary meaning. For this reason the majority of the Court 
of Appeal's view that the words require a degree of consensus
52 seems 
more appealing.53 It also has the added attractiveness that consensus is a 
concept well established in law. 
In BNZI the High Court and the majority of the Court of Appeal 
were both of the view that two or more people were required for there to 
be an arrangement. 54 The majority of the Court of Appeal cited Davis v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation
55 as authority that bilaterality is 
"found in the very nature of the words, contracts, agreements, or 
arrangements."56 The Court in Davis were not however considering a 
provision that included the term 'plan', and it is to this term that Justice 
Thomas referred to support his view that unilateral arrangements were 
possible. 57 Whether unilateral arrangements are embraced by the 
section 99(1) definition hinges predominantly on the interpretation 
accorded to the term 'plan'. Based on the discussion of the meaning of 
plan above, the view that unilateral arrangements are embraced by the 
section is somewhat dubious. Therefore while it is possible to 
contemplate situations where one person enters into a senes of 
transactions aimed at tax avoidance,58 and conceptually there is no 
51 BNZlv CIR, above, 15,787 (HC) McGechan J. 
52 CIR v BNZI, above, 17,116 (CA) Richardson P. 
53 The more contentious question of whether the taxpayer against whom section 99 is 
sought to be applied must be part of this consensus will be discussed below in section 
VIC 1 Words of section 99. 
54 CIR v BNZI, above, 17,116 (CA) Richardson P and BNZI v CIR, above, 15,787 (HC) 
McGechan J. 
55 (1989) 86 ALR 195 (FCA). 
56 Davis v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 86 ALR 195, 227 Hill J (FCA). 
57 CIR v BNZI, above, 17,133 (CA) Thomas J dissenting. The issue arose in Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation v lutovi Investments Pty lid (1978) 9 ATR 351, 356 
Mason and Gibbs JJ where a majority of the High Court of Australia held that a 
reso lution of the Board of Directors was an 'arrangement' although not in the context 
ofa GAP. 
58 Such as the example used by ICF Spry of a trnstee declaring complex trnsts in 
favour of unborn children. ICF Spry Section 260 of the Income Tax Assessment Act (2 
ed, The Law Book Company Ltd, Melbourne, 1978) 14. This justification is of less 
significance now however in the light of the section 99(3) power to reconstrnct against 
taxpayers. 
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sound reason not to include them within the definition,59 the prevailing 
weight of authority in New Zealand suggests that there can be no 
arrangement without two or more people. 
The final point that is apparent from the background to the 
definition of arrangement is that it is intended to have a very broad 
scope. As Justice Thomas noted "the definition of 'arrangement' could 
not be expressed more widely."60 Justice McGechan however observed 
that the requirement that there be an arrangement was an intentional 
limit on the scope of section 99,6 1 and he went on to say that 
Parliament's "deliberately limited focus [should] be respected and 
advanced, not subverted by expansionist approaches."62 The majority of 
the Court of Appeal also viewed the requirement of an arrangement as a 
limit on the scope of section 99. 63 It is submitted that, although it is 
correct to say that an arrangement is required by the section, the 
extremely broad drafting of the definition is illustrative of the fact that it 
was not intended to be a significant limit on the application of the 
section. Thus it was intended that the section could be applied to even 
the most informal types of arrangements and that the section 99(2) test 
of tax avoidance would then act to limit the section's scope, by 
distinguishing between acceptable tax mitigation and non-acceptable tax 
avoidance. 64 The adoption of a broad definition is consistent with the 
past approach of the courts in Australia and the definition of a 'scheme' 
now found in the Australian GAP,65 as well as being consistent with the 
59 C Ohms "Section 99: The General Anti-Avoidance Rule - Analysis and Reform" 
(1994) 1 NZJTLP 87, 93. 
6° CIR v BNZI, above, 17,131 (CA) Thomas J dissenting. 
6 1 CIR v BNZ!, above, 17,117 (CA) Richardson P. 
62 BNZ lnveshnents Ltd v Commissioner of lnland Revenue (2000) 19 NZTC 15,732, 
15,788 (HC) McGechan J. 
63 CIR v BNZI, above, 17,115-17,116 (CA) Richardson P. 
64 Challenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of lnland Revenue [1986] 2 NZLR 513, 
561 (PC) Lord Templeman. 
65 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Aus), s 177 A . 
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approach of the Canadian courts to the definition of 'transaction' m 
Canada. 66 
b) Including all steps and transactions by which 
it is carried into effect 
While both courts in BNZI considered the meanmg of the terms 
"contract, agreement, plan or understanding", the judgments spend little 
time considering the meaning and effect of the words "including all 
steps and transactions by which it is carried into effect" also included in 
the definition of arrangement. 
The rationale for the inclusion of these words is illuminated by 
Lord Denning in Newton. He noted that the term 'arrangement' must 
"comprehend not only the initial plan but also all the transactions by 
which it is carried into effect", for it would be useless for the 
Commissioner to avoid the arrangement and leave the transaction still 
standing.67 Furthermore, since the definition applies to arrangements 
that are not necessarily legally enforceable, to make them 'void' would 
not necessarily have any impact. Thus it is necessary to include within 
the arrangement the steps and transactions that give effect to it so that 
they too may be voided under the section. 68 
The majority of the Court of Appeal noted that these words do not 
extend the 'arrangement' . They said that what they must be taken to 
mean is that the scope of the arrangement is determined by the initial 
consensus. 69 It would seem, based on Lord Denning's comments in 
Newton, that this interpretation has substantial merit. Therefore the 
scope of the arrangement should be determined by the initial 
aITangement, and while the arrangement includes those steps and 
66 J R Owen "Statutory Interpretation and the General Anti-Avoidance Rule: A 
Practitioner's Perspective" (1998) 46 CTJ 233, 236. 
67 Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1958] AC 450, 465 (PC) Lord 
Denning for the Court. 
68 ICF Spry Section 260 of the Income Tax Assessment Act (2 ed, The Law Book 
Company Ltd, Melbourne, 1978) 11 . 
69 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v BNZ in vestments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,103, 
17,11 7 (CA) Richardson P. 
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transactions by which it is effected, the words cannot be used as a 
mechanism to extend the scope of the arrangement beyond that initially 
contemplated. 
In BNZI Justice McGechan referred to evidence that when BNZ 
became aware that they would have considerable trading losses, they 
made known to CML that they were reluctant to continue with RPS 
investments. However, due to considerable pressure from CML based 
on commitments CML had already made, BNZ were forced to 
continue. 70 In the light of evidence of this pressure it is somewhat 
surprising that the courts did not give greater consideration to whether it 
could be said that BNZI's RPS investment was part of the downstream 
tax avoidance arrangement by virtue of the fact that the RPS investment 
was a step or transaction by which the tax avoidance arrangement was 
carried into effect. Given CML's insistence that BNZ continue, it 
would appear that the RPS investment was clearly contemplated as part 
of the initial arrangement. In fact Justice McGechan was prepared to 
find that "there is no doubt that BNZI's RPS transactions caused the 
downstream arrangements in a 'but for' sense",7' thus it would seem 
that not only was the RPS transaction contemplated, but it was clearly 
an essential and necessary step in order to give effect to the downstream 
arrangement. Accordingly it would appear at least arguable that the 
RPS transaction was a step or transaction by which the downstream 
agreement was carried into effect. 
4. Identifying the arrangement 
The Valabh Committee noted that "as a matter of practice the courts and 
the revenue do not appear to have had much difficulty with the 
definition [ of arrangement] and have interpreted the scope as narrowly 
or as widely as the Commissioner contends."72 Identification of the 
7° CIR v BNZJ, above, 17, 112 (CA) Richardson P. 
71 BNZ investments Ltd v Commissioner of Jn/and Revenue (2000) 19 NZTC 15,732, 
15,789 (HC) McGechan J. 
72 The Valabh Committee Key Reforms to the Scheme of Tax l egislation (Wellington, 
October 199 1) 13. 
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arrangement has not in the past been an issue upon which the courts 
have focused, and it has also been said that it is not ordinarily necessary 
for the courts to set out all of the steps which are part of an 
arrangement. 73 It is nevertheless crucial that the relevant arrangement 
under section 99(1) be identified with some clarity as the issue of the 
tax avoidance purpose or effect under section 99(2) must be determined 
in relation to the identified arrangement.74 Different formulations of the 
arrangement may result in different conclusions as to the tax avoidance 
purpose or effect.75 It is necessary therefore to consider how an 
arrangement is identified. 
a) Identifying part of a broader arrangement 
It is common for an arrangement to comprise a number of contracts or 
agreements or a number of steps and transactions. In FCT v Peabody76 
the High Court of Australia considered the Commissioner's 
identification of the 'scheme' to which he purported the Australian GAP 
applied. In addressing this issue the Court accepted the Commissioner's 
identification of a scheme which was a narrower part of the broader 
scheme initially identified. 77 They said that although the Commissioner 
may not identify part of a scheme where the circumstances are 
incapable of standing on their own without being robbed of all practical 
meaning, that does not mean that if part of the scheme may be identified 
as a scheme in itself the Commissioner is precluded from relying upon 
it. 78 The result of allowing this approach is that it is legitimate for the 
taxing authority to ignore a wider arrangement, that may have been 
entered into for reasons other than tax avoidance, and focus on one 
73 ICF Spry Section 260 of the Income Tax Assessment Act (2 ed, The Law Book 
Company Ltd, Melbourne, 1978) 14. 
74 Davis v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 86 ALR 195, 226 Hill J (FCA). 
75 GT Pagone QC "Tax Planning or Tax Avoidance" (2000) 29 ATR 96, 108. See also 
N Orow "The Future of Australia's General Anti-Avoidance Provision" (1995) 1 
NZJTLP 225, 229. 
76 (1994) 181 CLR 359 (HCA). 
77 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Peabody (1994) 181 CLR 359, 384 (HCA) 
Judgment of the Court. 
78 FCT v Peabody, above, 383-384 (HCA) Judgment of the Court. 
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aspect of the scheme. 79 The Canadian GAP also expressly allows for 
this approach to be taken. 80 
This approach has been labelled the 'sub-scheme' approach. 81 The 
New Zealand courts however have not demonstrated a willingness to 
adopt such an approach. 82 Thus, in Case U683 the Taxation Review 
Authority said that the Commissioner's position was "fundamentally 
flawed" where he sought to treat one aspect of a broader investment 
scheme as the relevant arrangement under section 99.84 The Authority 
said "the offending transaction must be treated as a whole. It is 
impermissible to attempt to sever parts of it [ ... ] and characterise them 
as infringing section 99. "85 
The approach adopted in Case U6 is consistent with that approved 
by the House of Lords in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Brebner. 86 
That case involved a section which allowed the cancellation of a tax 
advantage obtained under a transaction if the taxpayer could not show 
that the transaction which gave rise to the tax advantage did not have 
obtaining a tax advantage as one of its main objectives. 87 In Inland 
Revenue Commissioners v Brebner there were a number of transactions 
relating to a wider share purchase agreement and its financing. The 
House of Lords rejected the Commissioner's attempt to divide the wider 
arrangement into separate parts and to determine the object of each part 
in isolation for the purposes of the application of the section. Lord 
Pearce upheld the Special Commissioners' decision and said that in 
applying the section they had "rightly approached the transaction as a 
79 C Ohms "Section 99: The General Anti-Avoidance Rule - Analysis and Reform" 
(1994) 1 NZJTLP 87, 93. Compare FCT v Peabody (1993) 93 ATC 4104, 4111 (FCA) 
Hill J. 
80 Income Tax Act 1952, s 245(3)(b) which defines an ' avoidance transaction ' as "any 
transaction that is part of a series of transactions that would result . . . in a tax benefit." 
81 Ohms, above, 93. 
82 J Bassett "Developments in Tax Avoidance" [2000] NZTPR 25 , 26. 
83 (1999) 19 NZTC 9,038 (TRA). 
84 Case U6 (1999) 19 NZTC 9,038, 9,059 (TRA) Willy DCJ. 
85 Case U6. above, 9,059 (TRA) Willy DCJ. 
86 [1967] 2 AC 18 (I-IL). 
87 Finance Act 1960 (UK), s28 . 
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whole from a broad common-sense view."88 The justification for his 
approval of this approach was his view that the section, which focused 
on a transaction's main object, would be robbed of all practical meaning 
if one had to isolate and ascertain the object of one part of the 
arrangement divorced from the object of the arrangement as a whole. 89 
This justification is, to a significant extent, applicable to section 99 
in the sense that the more narrowly the arrangement is identified, the 
more readily the requisite tax avoidance purpose or effect of the 
arrangement is likely to be established. The justification is not however 
as applicable to the Australian GAP since Part IV A expressly provides 
that the question of purpose may be determined by reference to part of a 
scheme.90 
The New Zealand courts' rejection of the sub-scheme approach is 
considered pragmatically sound. 9 1 Furthermore it is consistent with the 
Consultative Committee's view that although extraordinary and 
superfluous tax elements that fom1 part of the arrangement under review 
could have section 99 applied to them by viewing them removed from 
the broader arrangement of which they are part, on balance, they said 
"there must be an opportunity to achieve non-tax objectives in a tax 
efficient manner and that the appropriate restraint on excessive tax 
effectiveness is simply the dominant objective test."92 
However, although the Australian GAP does refer to 'part of a 
scheme' 93 the High Court of Australia pointed out in FCT v Peabody 
that the definition of scheme did not include part of a scheme.94 
Therefore, at a conceptual level, based on the words of section 99, the 
88 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Brebner [1967) 2 AC 18, 26 (HL) Lord Pearce. 
89 IRC v Brebner, above, 27 (HL) Lord Pearce. 
90 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Aus), s l 77D. 
9 1 C Ohms "Section 99: The General Anti-Avoidance Rule - Analysis and Reform" 
(1994) 1 NZJTLP 87, 93. 
92 The Valabh Conunittee Final Report of the Consultative Committee on the Taxation 
of Incom e from Capital (Wellington, October 1992) 26. 
93 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Aus), s 177 A(5) and s l 77D. 
94 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Peabody (1994) 181 CLR 359, 384 (HCA) 
Judgment of the Court. 
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principle in FCT v Peabody that, if part of an arrangement can stand on 
its own as an arrangement, then that part may itself be identified as an 
arrangement, is also valid under the New Zealand GAP. Thus if 
subsequent New Zealand courts decide to follow the rejection of the 
sub-scheme approach in Case U6, they will need to do so on the basis of 
a gloss read into section 99. 
b) Identifying a broader arrangement 
Regardless of whether or not a narrower part of a broader arrangement 
can be identified for GAP purposes, it has long been recognised that a 
transaction may merely be part of a wider arrangement which may be 
identified for the application of a GAP.95 However, while the courts 
have recognised that a broader arrangement may be identified, the basis 
on which they determine the scope of that broader arrangement is not 
readily apparent. It is possible however to draw on English authorities to 
suggest an appropriate basis for such a determination. 
The English courts have, in recent years, created what has become 
known as the 'doctrine of fiscal nullity.' WT Ramsay v Inland Revenue 
Commrs96 is regarded as the fountainhead of the doctrine of fiscal 
nullity,97 however the doctrine has been developed in a number of 
cases.98 Essentially the doctrine enables the court to treat a pre-ordained 
series of transactions as a composite whole for the purposes of the 
application of taxing provisions, rather than the court being restricted to 
applying the provision to each individual step.99 A feature of fiscal 
nullity cases is that typically the courts identify and determine the extent 
95 Bel! v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1953) 87 CLR 548, 573 (HCA) Dixon CJ 
for the Court. 
96 Macniven (inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland investments Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 
865 , 874 (HL) Lord Hoffman. 
97 [1982] AC 300 (HL) . 
98 See for example Furniss (Inspector of Taxes) v Dawson [1984] AC 474 (HL) and 
/RC v McGuckian [1997] 1 WLR 991 (HL) and Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v 
Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 865. 
99 WT Ramsay v inland Revenue Commrs [1982] AC 300, 323-324 (HL) Lord 
Wilberforce. 
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of the broader arrangement in question and discuss the principles by 
which they do so. 
To determine whether there is a broader composite transaction for 
fiscal nullity purposes the courts have regard to whether the series of 
transactions in question was pre-ordained at the time of the first 
transaction. 100 Although the meaning of 'pre-ordained' has been subject 
to judicial disagreement, the prevailing view is that for a series to be 
pre-ordained it must be 'practically certain' at the time of the first step, 
that the further steps will be carried through to completion. 101 Lord 
Oliver elaborated on the meaning of "practical certainty" saying that: 102 
it is essential that at least principle te1ms should be agreed to the 
point at which there is no practical likelihood that the transaction will 
not take place. 
He went on to note that it is not sufficient that the transaction that 
occurs is of a kind contemplated. 103 
The Supreme Court of Canada has said that the doctrine of fiscal 
nullity is not applicable in Canada as it was perceived to conflict with 
the principle in IRC v Duke of Westminster' 04 • 105 Similarly, in Australia 
the Full High Court in John v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 106 said 
that there was no room for the application of the doctrine of fiscal 
nullity due to the presence of the Australian GAP. 107 
10° Craven (Inspector of Taxes) v White [1989] AC 398,515 (HL) Lord Oliver. 
101 Craven v White, above, 516-5 l 7(HL) Lord Oliver. See also Furniss (Inspector of 
Taxes) v Dawson [1984] AC 474 (HL). 
102 Craven v White, above, 517 (HL) Lord Oliver. 
103 Craven v White, above, 517 (HL) Lord Oliver. The minority in Craven (!nspector 
of Taxes) v White preferred a less resh·ictive approach and took the view that pre-
ordained meant no more than that the re levant transactions have been planned in 
advance as a who le, with evidence of advanced agreement on later stages bemg no 
more than "useful evidence" of this : see Craven (Inspector of Taxes) v White [1989] 
AC 398, 522 (HL) Lord Goff dissenting. 
104 [1936] AC I, 19 (HL) Lord Tomlin. This is commonly refened to as the form over 
substance approach. 
105 Stubart Investments Limited v Her Majesty the Queen [1984] CTC 294 (SCC). 
106 (1989) 89 ATC 4101 (HCA). 
107 Johns v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 89 ATC 4101 , 4,110 (HCA). 
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In the New Zealand legal context, the doctrine of fiscal nullity has 
been the subject of judicial discussion on a number of occasions. 
However, despite this and the recommendation by the Committee of 
Expe1is that this matter be clarified by legislative amendment, 108 no 
definitive conclusion has yet been reached on the doctrine's place in 
New Zealand tax law. 109 
In IRC v McGuckian 110 Lord Cooke said that the doctrine does not 
depend on GAPs such as that found in New Zealand, rather that it is 
"antecedent to or collateral with them." 111 Similarly, the Committee of 
Experts in their report were of the opinion that there is no reason why 
the doctrine of fiscal nullity should be precluded from applying in New 
Zealand by virtue of the fact that a statutory GAP exists. 112 
However there are views resisting the application of the doctrine in 
New Zealand. In the High Court for example, Justice Baragwanath 
commented that it is unnecessary for the courts in New Zealand to 
develop a concept of fiscal nullity to protect the tax base due to the 
presence of the GAP. 11 3 Similarly, in BNZI Justice McGechan expressly 
rejected the Commissioner's contention that 'Ramsay type' analysis was 
appropriate. He said that he was unable to accept that "the threshold 
question of 'arrangement' was determined, or even much assisted, by 
'
08 Committee of Expetis on Tax Compliance Tax Compliance - Report to the 
Treasurer and Minister of Revenue (Wellington, December 1998) 128. 
109 http ://www.brookers.co.nz, G Cole Smart Tax Commenta,y - Income Tax Act 1994 
Conm1entary - IT AC Part BG 1 [Avoidance] (Last updated 30 May 2001 ). See further 
D Coull "Application of the fiscal nullity doctrine in New Zealand" [2001] NZTPR 
17-21. 
11 0 [1997] 1 WLR 991 (HL). 
111 IRC v McGuckian [1997] 1 WLR 991, 1005 (HL) Lord Cooke. See also recent 
comments 111 the Privy Council that the doctrine of fiscal nullity had "taken over" 
some of the work that provisions such as the New Zealand GAP used to do, implicitly 
suggesting therefore that the doctTine was applicable in the New Zealand context: 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Auckland Harbour Board (2000) 20 NZTC 17,008, 
17,012 (PC) Lord Hoffman. Note also the language adopted by Lord Hoffman in 
0 'Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2001) 20 NZTC 17,051 , 17,057 (PC) 
which is consistent with the language of fiscal nullity cases. 
11 2 Conm1ittee of Experts on Tax Compliance Tax Compliance - Report to the 
Treasurer and Minister of Revenue (Wellington, December 1998) 128. 
11 3 Mi//er v Commissioner of Inland Revenue; McDouga/1 v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue (No 1) (1997) 18 NZTC 13,001, 13,036 (HC) Baragwanath J. 
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Ramsay doctrine as to composite transactions." 114 He said that the 
"doctrine was not, and is not, intended to determine the scope of an 
'arrangement' within the special and exhaustive definition contained in 
section 99(1 )." 11 5 It is interesting to note however that Justice 
McGechan said in relation to the Ramsay doctrine that "[ c Jertainly, it 
can be useful and applicable in ascertaining the 'purpose' of an 
arrangement as established." 11 6 
In Craven (Inspector of Taxes) v White Lord Oliver said: 
[i]n the ultimate analysis, most, if not all, revenue cases depend upon 
a point of statutory construction, the question in each case being 
whether a particular transaction or a particular combination of 
circumstances does or does not fall within a particular formula 
prescribed by the taxing statute as one which attracts fiscal liability. 
As part of that process it is, of course, necessary for the courts to 
identify that which is the relevant transaction or combination before 
construing and applying it to the statutory formula . Reduced to its 
simplest terms that is all that Ramsay did. 
In applying section 99, the courts in New Zealand are required to do 
exactly that which his Lordship describes above, that is identify an 
arrangement under section 99(1), and apply section 99(2) to that 
arrangement. Indeed, the fact noted by Lord Templeman that section 99 
would apply to a number of English fiscal nullity cases, including 
Ramsay, is illustrative that there is a considerable degree of overlap 
between section 99 and the fiscal nullity doctrine. 11 7 
In addition, the English comis' approach to identifying a 
composite arrangement is consistent with what little case law exists on 
how an 'arrangement' is to be identified under a GAP in the nature of 
section 99. In Bell v Federal Commissioner of Taxation the Court 
seemed to determine the extent of the wider arrangement by looking at 
114 BNZ Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2000) 19 NZTC 15,732, 
15,789 (HC) McGechan J. 
11 5 BNZJ v CIR, above, 15,789 (HC) McGechan J. 
11 6 BNZI v CIR, above, 15,789 (HC) McGechan J. 
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the preconcerted plan. 118 Justice Speight in the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal took a similar approach saying that: 119 
the whole scheme must be examined going back to the original plan if 
there is evidence of one and to the steps which have ... been taken in 
pursuance of that plan. 
Indeed the majority of the Court of Appeal m BNZI agreed that the 
scope of the arrangement was to be determined by the initial 
consensus. 120 
Furthermore, Ashton v CIR, 121 one of the few New Zealand cases 
which has directly addressed the arrangement issue, is also consistent 
with the approach to identifying the arrangement in Ramsay analysis. In 
the context of determining whether a certain transaction formed part of 
the relevant arrangement, President McCarthy relied on the high degree 
of interdependence between steps in a broader transaction when he 
treated all the steps in question as part of one wider arrangement. 122 
Therefore given these similarities in approaches to determining the 
extent of an arrangement, it is submitted that regardless of whether or 
not the doctrine of fiscal nullity as a whole has a place in New Zealand 
tax law, there is no good reason why the New Zealand courts should not 
draw on the approaches of the English courts to identifying the relevant 
arrangement under the doctrine, for the purposes of developing a 
coherent approach to the application of section 99(1). This suggestion 
has judicial support. In Mills v Dowdall, 123 a case which concerned 
matrimonial property legislation, Justice Cooke (as he then was) 
117 Challenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1986] 2 NZLR 
513, 562 (PC) Lord Templeman. 
118 Bell v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1953) 87 CLR 548, 573 (HCA) Dixon 
CJ for the Court. 
119 McKay v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1973) 3 ATR 379,391 (CA) Speight J 
(emphasis added). 
120 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v BNZ Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,103, 
17 ,116-17,117 (CA) Richardson P. 
121 [1974] 2 NZLR 321 (CA). 
122 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Ashton [1974] 2 NZLR 321, 329-330 (CA) 
McCarthy P. 
123 [1983] NZLR 154 (CA). 
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considered the appropriate approach to take to a series of transactions 
intended to act in combination. He referred to the Ramsay approach and 
saw no reason why it could be applied not only to tax cases, but also 
more widely. 124 There is also support for this contention from Canada, 
where although fiscal nullity has been rejected, many commentators 
consider Ramsay type analysis may be of relevance to interpreting the 
words 'series of transactions' found in the Canadian GAP. 125 
It is worth considering therefore whether the Commissioner should 
have been able to successfully argue that the BNZI RPS transactions 
were part of a wider arrangement encompassing the downstream tax 
avoidance transactions. To apply the Ramsay analysis to the facts of 
BNZI it is necessary to consider whether at the time of the initial 
agreement the series of transactions was pre-ordained. The agreement 
between CML and BNZI was that BNZI would advance finance to 
CML in return for RPSs which would pay dividends at agreed rates 
reflecting 50% of the tax saving generated by the downstream 
transactions. Crucially however, CML did not disclose any aspect of 
the downstream transactions to BNZI. Thus while it was agreed that 
CML would utilise the funds advanced to generate supernormal returns 
via tax effective structuring, BNZI did not know the nature of the 
structure to be used. Evidence was accepted that BNZI proceeded on 
the assumption that a commonplace loss utilisation scheme would be 
used. In the view of Justice Blanchard, BNZI did not even have a broad 
appreciation of the character of what was occurring downstream. 126 In 
tenns of Ramsay analysis, this level of agreement is insufficient. 127 The 
threshold is therefore relatively high, and even if it could be met in 
BNZI, it would still be necessary to consider whether the downstream 
124 Mills v Dowdall [1983] ZLR 154, 157 (CA) Cooke J. 
125 D Finkelstein (ed) Canadian Tax Service (Looseleaf, Thompson Canada Ltd, 
Ontario) Income Tax Act (RSC 1985) Part XVI para 245-108 . See also J Tiley "Series 
of Transactions" in Report of the Proceedings of the Fortieth Tax Conference 
(Canadian Tax Foundation, Ontario, 1988) 8: 1, 8:5-8:6 and B Arnold "The Canadian 
General Anti-Avoidance Rule" [1995] BTR 541 , 549. 
126 Commissioner of inland Revenue v BNZ Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,103, 
17,142 (CA) Blanchard J. 
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transactions were practically certain to occur at the time of the RPS 
agreements, in the sense that there was no practical likelihood that at the 
time of the RPS agreement, the downstream transactions would not 
follow. This aspect of the Ramsay analysis would appear to be more 
readily satisfied on the facts of BNZI. While it is not clear, it seems 
likely that CML would have had the downstream arrangements in place 
at the time they agreed to the RPS deal as is suggested by the speed with 
which the downstream transactions occurred and the fact that BNZI had 
been pressured by CML to continue with RPS deals because of 
'commitments' they had entered into. 
An alternative approach would be to focus on the agreement 
between CML and the downstream entities. To do so is more difficult, 
due to the focus of the courts on the facts in relation to the upstream 
agreement. However, if it could be said that at the time the downstream 
transactions were agreed there was agreement that CML would obtain 
finance via an RPS deal with BNZI and there was no practical 
likelihood it would not occur, it would be arguable to say that there was 
a single pre-ordained arrangement comprising the upstream and 
downstream transactions. This analysis is a more contentious approach 
and it is arguably a strained application of the Ramsay type analysis 
since it does not focus on the agreement entered into by the relevant 
taxpayer as the Ramsay cases do. If this approach is however valid, 
whether it would be possible to identify the arrangement as a pre-
ordained one would depend on further information in relation to the 
nature of the downstream arrangement. 
5. Arrangement - Conclusion 
The concept of arrangement has been drafted in extremely broad terms, 
and while the courts have from time to time grappled with how to 
identify the arrangement's scope, in the end it has not in the past been 
considered difficult to fit some form of agreement within the definition 
127 Craven (Inspector of Taxes) v White [1989) AC 398,517 (HL) Lord Oliver. 
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of an arrangement. 128 The discussion above has suggested that it might 
have been possible to bring within an arrangement the RPS transaction 
of BNZI either as being a step or transaction by which an arrangement 
was carried out, or adopting the Ramsay analysis, by virtue of the fact 
that the RPS deal was part of a pre-ordained arrangement encompassing 
the downstream transactions. The conclusion that this might have been 
possible does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that, had the High 
Court and Court of Appeal majority identified the arrangement in this 
way, the result of the case would have been that the arrangement was 
void as a tax avoidance arrangement. The courts would still have had to 
go on and consider if the broad arrangement identified could be said to 
have the requisite tax avoidance purpose. 
B The Approach to Interpretation of Section 99 
The discussion above has implicitly accepted that for section 99 to 
apply to BNZI, it was necessary to identify an arrangement that 
encompassed the RPS deal to which BNZI were a participant. It is 
however by no means clear that this is actually required by the terms of 
section 99. In determining the section 99(1) question of whether there 
was an arrangement, a common theme and focus of all the judgments in 
the BNZI cases was the consideration of whether BNZI had knowledge 
of, involvement in, or could in some way be implicated with the 
downstream tax avoidance transactions. This section of the paper will 
discuss the validity of according such importance to the 'participation' 
in the arrangement of the taxpayer against whom it is sought to apply 
section 99. 
1. The approach of the courts in BNZI 
Both the High Court and the majority of the Court of Appeal placed 
significant weight on the fact that BNZI had no knowledge of or 
involvement in the downstream tax avoidance transactions to reach their 
conclusion that there was no arrangement under section 99(1). In the 
128 NHM Forsyth QC "The General Structure of Part IVA" (1981) 10 ATR 132. 
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High Court Justice McGechan said that "there must be conscious or tacit 
involvement before a taxpayer can be said to be party to an 
arrangement." 129 Conscious involvement, he said, required more than to 
merely know or have notice of something, since "to know is not 
necessarily to 'arrange' ... [m]ore is required." 130 It is clear therefore, 
under the High Court approach, that as a matter of law, before an 
arrangement could even be held to exist, the taxpayer against whom 
section 99 was to be applied would need to be found to have the 
requisite level of involvement in the activity sought to be rendered void. 
Justice McGechan held that on the facts BNZI had neither the required 
conscious nor tacit involvement in the downstream transactions. 131 
Crucially therefore, he concluded that "I find BNZ/BNZI were not party 
to an 'arrangement' within s[ection] 99 involving the downstream 
transactions. Section 99 cannot apply." 132 
Similarly, the majority of the Court of Appeal took the approach 
that for there to be an arrangement under section 99(1) there must be 
consensus between parties. 133 That consensus they said "must 
encompass explicitly or implicitly the dimension which actually 
amounts to tax avoidance; albeit the taxpayer does not have to know 
that such dimension amounts to tax avoidance." 134 There must be 
consensus as to what is to be done. 135 Therefore, while they differ 
slightly from the High Court in the nature of the involvement a taxpayer 
must have in an arrangement, it is implicit in their reasoning that they 
too required, as a matter of law, that the relevant taxpayer have a certain 
level of involvement before an arrangement can be said to exist. 
129 BNZ Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2000) 19 NZTC 15,732, 
15,791 (HC) McGechan J (emphasis added). 
130 BNZI v CIR, above, 15,790-15,791 (HC) McGechan J. 
131 BNZI v CIR, above, 15,793 (HC) McGechan J. 
132 BNZI v CIR, above, 15,793 (HC) McGechan J (emphasis added). 
133 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v BNZ Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,103, 
17,117 (CA) Richardson P. 
134 CIR v BNZI, above, 17,117 (CA) Richardson P. 
135 CIR v BNZI, above, 17,117 (CA) Richardson P. 
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2. A matter of fact and degree or a matter of law? 
It is interesting that both the High Court and the majority of the Court of 
Appeal adopted this approach in the light of the fact that often in tax 
law, issues are determined "as a matter of fact and degree." Thus issues 
of capital/revenue distinctions,1 36 apportionment of expenditure, 
137 
reasonableness of remuneration paid, 138 whether a taxpayer is carrying 
on a business139 and whether investments were acquired with a purpose 
of resale 140 are just a few of the issues where the courts determine the 
outcome as a matter of fact and degree. 
It has long been accepted that section 99 must be given a non-
literal interpretation. Thus in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v 
Gerard President McCarthy noted with reference to New Zealand's 
GAP prior to section 99: 141 
it cannot be given a literal application, for that would, the 
Commissioner has always agreed, result in the avoidance of 
transactions which were obviously not aimed at by the section. So the 
Courts have had to place glosses on the statutory language in order 
that the bounds might be held reasonably fairly between the Inland 
Revenue authorities and taxpayers. 
However, the glosses the courts have applied to section 99 to make it 
function effectively, like those in other parts of tax law, have in the past 
been considered as a matter of fact and degree rather than being 
required as a matter of law. Thus as President Woodhouse stated, in a 
136 Henwood v Commissioner of inland Revenue (1995) 17 NZTC 12,271 (CA) and 
Poverty Bay Electric Power Board v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1999] 2 NZLR 
438 (CA). 
137 Europa Oil (New Zealand) Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1970] NZLR 
32 1 (CA) . 
13 Troon Place in vestments Ltd v Commissioner of inland Revenue; GS Mathews 
(Chemist) Ltd (1995) 17 NZTC 12,175 (HC). 
139 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Stockwell [1993] 2 NZLR 40 (CA). 
140 T Piers and Ors Trustees of the Alexander and Alexander Pension Plan v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1995) 17 NZTC 12,283 (HC). 
141 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Gerard [ 1974] 2 NZLR 279, 280 (CA) 
McCarthy P. 
34 
LAWS516 The Scope and Effect of Section 99 Ross Nelson 
leading authority on section 99 in New Zealand, Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd: 142 
in tl1e end, like so much else in the law, the breadili of ilie qualifying 
phrase in section 99( 1 )2(b ), and so the ambit of the section itself will 
be discovered as a matter of fact and degree on a case by case basis. 
More recently it was noted that "what is legitimate 'mitigation' and 
what is illegitimate 'avoidance' is in the end to be decided by the 
Commissioner, Taxation Review Authority and ultimately the courts, as 
a matter ofjudgement." 143 
It is argued by some that to approach the GAP in such a way, and 
to leave the law relating to the provision open and flexible gives rise to 
uncertainty. Speaking of Australia's previous GAP one commentator 
said "the section in its operation lacks one element which is socially and 
commercially essential in a taxing statute: certainty."144 
The response to this criticism is twofold. The first response is that 
the legislature intended to and has deliberately chosen to leave the GAP 
flexible in its operation. President Woodhouse in Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd discussed this at some 
length and noted that although a more detailed amendment was 
considered during the redraft, it was deemed unacceptable. 145 A similar 
point was made more recently when it was said that "Parliament has 
deliberately left [ section BG 1] open textured. " 146 
The second response to this criticism is that uncertainty m the 
operation of the section is desirable for the reason that it makes the 
section more effective. This point has been made a number of times, 
142 [1986] 2 NZLR 5 13, 534 (CA) Woodhouse P. 
143 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue; McDougall v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue (1997) 18 NZTC 13,001, 13,031 (HC) Baragwanath J (emphasis added). 
144 M J Trebilcock "Section 260: A Critical Examination" (1964) 38 ALJ 237, 247. 
145 [1986] 2 NZLR 513 , 534 (CA) Woodhouse P. 
146 Miller v CIR; McDougall v CIR, above, 13 ,030 (HC) Baragwanath J. 
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perhaps most notably by the Committee of Experts in Tax Compliance 
when they said: 147 
if a general anti-avoidance provision is to be effective, it cannot be 
precise. Although this feature of an anti-avoidance provision means 
less certainty for taxpayers, the Committee believes that this cost is 
outweighed by the benefit provided by the flexible wording of the 
general anti-avoidance rule, allowing the court to address new and 
different types of tax avoidance anangements. 
It has also been said of GAPs that their vagueness protects them from 
attack as it denies lawyers and accountants the clear target of specific 
legislation which makes them prone to manipulation. 148 
Thus while the level of involvement by a taxpayer may arguably 
be an important factor worthy of consideration when the courts are 
addressing the issue of whether there is an arrangement under section 
99(1), it is submitted that it would be more appropriate for the courts to 
consider it as one factor, along with others, to determine whether as a 
matter of fact and degree there is an arrangement. By reading a gloss 
into the terms of section 99 requiring taxpayer involvement as a matter 
of law, the courts in BNZI could be criticised for attempting to render 
certain what the legislature and previous courts have, time and time 
again, left uncertain. In doing so the courts not only potentially 
unde1mine the effectiveness of section 99, but put themselves at risk of 
allegations of blurring the role of the legislature as law maker, and that 
of the courts to interpret law. 
C Relevance of Taxpayer Involvement 
Whether it was appropriate that the courts required taxpayer 
involvement as a matter of law can be questioned. A more fundamental 
147 Committee of Experts on Tax Compliance Tax Compliance - Report to the 
Treasurer and Minister of Revenue (Wellington, December 1998) 129. 
14 D Crerar "Interpretations of GAAR: Before and Beyond McNichol and RMM" 
( 1997) 23 QueensLJ 231, 251 citing in support CFL Young "The Attribution Rules: 
Their Uncertain Future in the Light of Current Problems" (1987) 35 Can Tax J 275, 
310. 
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question 1s whether or not in addressing the arrangement issue the 
involvement of a particular taxpayer should be considered at all. 
I. Words of section 99 
Although the words of section 99(1) support the conclusion that for 
there to be an arrangement there must exist a consensus between parties, 
it is submitted that on their terms they import no need that the taxpayer 
against whom section 99 is to be applied be in some way involved in the 
arrangement. In fact, read in the context of the rest of section 99 there 
is a strong argument that to import such a requirement is inappropriate. 
Section 99(2) says: 149 
Eve,y arrangement made or entered into, whether before or after the 
commencement of this Act, shall be absolutely void as against the 
Conmlissioner for income tax purposes if and to the extent that, 
directly or indirectly, -
(a) Its purpose or effect is tax avoidance; or ... 
whether or not any person affected by that arrangement is a party 
thereto. 
Section 99(2) clearly applies to every arrangement that has tax 
avoidance as its purpose or effect. The focus of the section is on the 
an-angement, not the taxpayer. 150 The scheme of the section is such that 
section 99(2) requires the focus to be placed on the arrangement as 
identified under section 99(1). Section 99(1) imports no requirement to 
consider whether any particular taxpayer was a participant, it simply 
exists as a section to help identify those contracts, agreements, plans 
and understandings to which the rest of section 99 will be applied. 
Although the arrangement must be "made or entered into" there is no 
requirement that the relevant taxpayer be a party to the arrangement in 
any sense of the word, before section 99 can be applied against them. 
149 (Emphasis added). 
150 Withey v Commissioner of Inland Revenue ( 1998) 18 NZTC 13,606, 13 ,608 (HC) 
Baragwanath J. 
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To the contrary, section 99(2) takes care to extend the ability to avoid 
arrangements to where persons affected are not 'parties' .15 1 
2. What does 'party ' mean? 
As discussed, section 99(2) expressly extends beyond those who are 
party to the arrangement by virtue of the words "whether or not any 
person affected by that arrangement is a party thereto." It is therefore 
important to understand what is meant by 'party' in the context of 
section 99. In contract law, when one refers to a 'party' one refers to 
the persons whose communications with each other have resulted in the 
agreement. 152 However in section 99 the term 'party' is used in relation 
to an ' arrangement'. As discussed, an arrangement is a very broad 
concept and includes far more than contracts. It is suggested in this 
context, that to be a party to an understanding for example, one would 
expect that a person had a degree of participation or involvement in that 
understanding. Therefore, 'party' in section 99(2) is used in a broader 
sense than that one would normally associate with contract law. 
Additionally, as noted, the section is clearly intended to extend beyond 
such parties, and therefore to require taxpayer participation in an 
arrangement before the GAP can apply is at odds with the words of the 
section. 
3. Restriction of section 99(1) to parties illogical 
The approach of the High Court and the majority of the Court of 
Appeal, by focusing on taxpayers and their level of involvement in the 
arrangement when determining the section 99(1) threshold, is not only 
inconsistent with the words of section 99, but clearly leads to a narrower 
scope of the section than the legislature has expressly contemplated. 
Justice McGechan in his judgrnent noted that: 
153 
151 BNZ In vestments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2000) 19 NZTC 15,732, 
15 ,787 (HC) McGechan J. 
152 AG Guest (ed) Chitty on Contracts (27 ed, Sweet & Maxwell , 1994) 901. 
153 BNZI v CIR, above, 15,787 (HC) McGechan J. 
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Although section 99(2) does take care to extend the ability to avoid 
arrangements to where persons affected are not parties to the 
arrangement, this does not affect the threshold requirement for an 
arrangement between parties in the first place. 
He went on to conclude that as BNZI were not party to an 
'arrangement' within section 99 involving the downstream transactions, 
section 99 could not apply. 154 The approach adopted by the High Court 
requires that the taxpayer be in some way involved, or 'party' to the tax 
avoidance arrangement before the section 99(1) threshold is met. It is 
difficult to reconcile this approach with the words of section 99(2). If 
the relevant taxpayer must be 'party' to the arrangement before section 
99 can be applied to them, the express extension of section 99(2) to 
avoid tax avoidance arrangements whether the taxpayer is party or not is 
rendered impotent. It is submitted that this is a significant flaw in the 
Court's approach, and one equally applicable to the approach adopted 
by the majority of the Court of Appeal. However, while both Courts 
acknowledged the section 99(2) extension beyond parties that led to this 
flaw, neither of the Courts attempted to explain their effect under the 
approach they adopted to section 99(1). 
Justice Thomas in his dissent makes a similar observation with 
regard to the High Court and majority's requirement of taxpayer 
participation by reference to section 99(3). Where an arrangement is 
void under section 99(2), section 99(3) gives the Commissioner the 
ability to counteract any tax advantage obtained from or under that 
arrangement by any person affected by the arrangement. Justice 
Thomas noted that: 155 
if a person affected by the arrangement is subject to the 
Commissioner' s powers, and therefore not necessarily involved or 
aware of its tax avoidance implications, it is difficult to see why a 
party would need to be consciously involved or agree to the tax 
avoidance. It would be anomalous if a person was excluded from an 
154 BNZJ v CIR, above, 15,793 (HC) McGechan J. 
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anangement because he or she was not aware of the tax avoidance, 
but another person who is also not aware of the anangement but is 
affected by it could be subject to reassessment under section 99(3). 
Justice Blanchard attempted to address this point in his judgment 
by saying that although an adjustment may be made against a taxpayer 
affected by, but not necessarily party to the arrangement, this could only 
be done where the tax advantage has been obtained by the taxpayer 
"under that arrangement."156 He went on to say that the higher 
dividends received by BNZI that were funded by the downstream tax 
avoidance arrangement were not obtained under that arrangement. With 
respect, section 99(3) also allows an adjustment where tax advantage 
has been obtained from a tax avoidance arrangement, an issue Justice 
Blanchard does not address. 
Furthermore, and more fundamentally, by requiring that BNZI be a 
participant in the downstream tax avoidance arrangement, the very 
question of whether the tax advantage they may or may not have 
received from or under that tax avoidance arrangement cannot even 
arise. For under the approach adopted by Justice Blanchard and the 
majority, because BNZI was not a participant in that arrangement, there 
is no arrangement under section 99(1) to which the section can even 
apply. 
4. Directly or indirectly 
The section 99(1) definition of 'tax avoidance' further supports the 
argument that it is inconsistent with the words of the section to require 
the taxpayer to be in some way party to the arrangement. Tax 
avoidance is defined to include: 
(a) Directly or indirectly altering the incidence of any income tax: 
(b) Directly or indirectly relieving any person from liability to pay 
income tax: 
155 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v ENZ Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,103, 
17,132 (CA) Thomas J dissenting. 
156 CIR v ENZ!, above, 17,142 (CA) Blanchard J. 
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(c) Directly or indirectly avoiding, reducing, or postponing any 
liability to income tax. 
Ross Nelson 
Section 99(2) also gives the ability to avoid an arrangement where it has 
either a direct or an indirect tax avoidance purpose or effect. As Justice 
Thomas said in BNZI "the repeated use of the word 'indirectly' is not 
decisive, but it must count against an interpretation which would restrict 
an arrangement to those who are consciously involved in it." 157 This is a 
valid observation, for if the application of section 99 were limited to 
instances where the taxpayer was a participant, the instances where an 
indirect tax avoidance purpose or effect could be counteracted would be 
considerably limited. 
5. Words of new legislation 
To date, most case law on New Zealand's GAP has been determined 
under section 99. However, this provision is now found in three parts of 
the Income Tax Act 1994. 158 The sections enacted are largely the same 
as section 99, and what changes were made were not intended to change 
the previous policy relating to the operation of the section. 159 Having 
said that, the argument, based on the wording of the section, that the 
taxpayer affected by an arrangement need not be a participant in the 
relevant arrangement is even more persuasive under the terms of the 
Income Tax Act 1994. Section OB 1 defines a 'tax avoidance 
arrangement' as "an arrangement, whether entered into by the person 
affected or another person, that directly or indirectly" has a tax 
avoidance purpose or effect. 160 So while the arrangement must be 
entered into, there is express recognition of the fact that the relevant 
taxpayer need not be the same person who entered into the arrangement. 
157 CIR v BNZI, above, 17,132 (CA) Thomas J dissenting. 
158 Income Tax Act 1994, ss BG 1, GB 1 and BB 9. 
159 Inland Revenue Department Tax Information Bulletin (Wellington, 1996) 8 TIB 9, 
8. 
160 (emphasis added). 
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6. The Commerce Act 1986 
The majority in the Court of Appeal placed reliance on the Commerce 
Act 1986 and cases decided under it for guidance on how to approach 
the section 99(1) arrangement issue. Justice Thomas in his dissent was 
critical of such reliance because: 161 
l. the Commerce Act and the Income Tax Act have different 
objectives; and 
2. determining that a meeting of the minds is required to complete an 
arrangement or understanding does not resolve the question of 
whether all taxpayers participating in that arrangement must be 
aware of the specific step or transactions which will amount to tax 
avoidance. 
The second of these criticisms relates to the issue of taxpayer 
participation and touches the heart of the issue not satisfactorily 
addressed in the High Court and majority of the Court of Appeal 
judgments. Both the Income Tax Act and the Commerce Act use the 
terms contract, arrangement and understanding and it may therefore be 
acceptable to draw on judicial statements as to the meaning of those 
terms as discussed in the context of Commerce Act cases. 162 
Nevertheless, this does not address the question of whether the relevant 
taxpayer must be one of those involved in the meeting of the minds. 
The Commerce Act decisions do not provide any assistance to the 
courts in this regard because the scope of that Act is comprehensively 
dealt with in its penalty provisions. Section 80 of the Commerce Act 
expressly extends the scope of that Act to include those who have 
entered into the arrangement, have aided, abetted, counselled, procured 
or induced another to enter into the arrangement or have been directly or 
indirectly knowingly concerned in or party to the contravention of 
another person. This is in stark contrast to section 99 which simply 
extends to those affected by an arrangement. 
161 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v BNZ Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,103, 
17,134 (CA) Thomas J dissenting. 
162 Commerce Act 1986, s 27. 
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7. New Zealand case law 
Interpreting a previous New Zealand GAP, 163 Justice Turner in the Court 
of Appeal held that the section could only be applied to parties to an 
arrangement. 164 However, subsequent to this President McCarthy 
rejected an argument in the Court of Appeal that the section did not 
apply on the basis that the taxpayer was not a party, in the strict sense of 
the word, to the arrangement. The Court said that the section would 
apply to others if it could be shown that the arrangement was procured 
by or with the connivance of the taxpayer. 165 
President McCarthy's judgment in Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue v Ashton166 affirmed the decision in Udy v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue, 167 a case that articulated well the reasons why such a 
restriction was not justified. In Udy v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
Chief Justice Wild said that although at first sight Justice Turner's view 
(stated above) was logical, it did not accord with authority. 168 He went 
on to note that section 108 contained no such limitation. 169 He said that 
"it is the alteration of the incidence of income tax in any way and the 
relief from liability of any person that the section hits at" and he saw 
nothing in the section's language which suggested it needed to be 
limited to those party to the transaction. 170 Drawing on Newton he 
observed that the focus of the section was on the arrangement, not the 
taxpayer, and said that while in most cases the taxpayer will be a party 
to the transaction, the courts have applied the section where the taxpayer 
was not legally a party. 171 In the opinion of Chief Justice Wild 
163 Land and Income Tax Act 1954, s 108. 
164 Wisheart, Macnab, and Kidd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1972] ZLR 319 
(CA) Turner J (emphasis in the original). 
165 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Ashton [1974] 2 NZLR 321,329 McCarthy P 
(CA). 
166 [1974] 2 NZLR 321(CA). 
167 [1972] NZLR 714 (SC). 
168 Udy v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1972] NZLR 714, 719 (SC) Wild CJ. 
169 Udy v CIR, above, 719 (SC) Wild CJ. 
170 Udy v CIR, above, 719 (SC) Wild CJ. 
171 Udy v CIR, above, 719 (SC) Wild CJ. 
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therefore, the GAP could be applied at least where the taxpayer 
procured the making of the transaction. 172 
Subsequent to these decisions the legislature amended the New 
Zealand GAP to include the words "whether party or not", thereby 
removing the scope for taxpayers to limit the scope of the section by 
technical arguments such as that accepted by Justice Turner in Wisheart, 
Macnab, and Kidd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue. 173 
More recently, when discussing who the Commissioner may 
subject to reassessment under section 99(3), Justice Blanchard said "he 
must believe that in terms of the taxing statute that the person is 
properly assessable, rather than being simply, for example, a relative or 
friend, not party to the impugned arrangement, to whom moneys or 
other assets have passed." 174 Justice McGechan in the High Court 
downplayed the significance of this statement, saying that at most it 
recognises that recipients may fall outside arrangements. 175 To the 
extent that this statement could be taken to suggest that a taxpayer must 
be party to an arrangement it is submitted that it would be inconsistent 
with both authority and the terms of the section itself. 
Thus while it is usual for the taxpayer to be party to the impugned 
arrangement, it is by no means necessary. The section imports no such 
requirement for it focuses on the arrangement, rather than the taxpayer, 
and it is the alteration of the incidence of tax that the section hits out at. 
Therefore for the same reasons that a taxpayer need not legally be party, 
it is consistent with authority and the section to suggest that taxpayer 
involvement is also unnecessary. 
172 Udy v CIR, above, 720 (SC) Wild CJ (emphasis added). 
173 [1972) NZLR 319 (CA). 
174 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue; Managed Fashions Ltd v Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue (1998) 18 NZTC 13,961, 13,970 (CA) Blanchard J for the Court. 
175 BNZ Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2000) 19 NZTC 15,732, 
15,788 (HC) McGechan J. 
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8. The Australian GAP 
Until relatively recently, Australia had a GAP similar to section 99, 176 
however it was thought to be ineffective and was therefore replaced by 
Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. 177 Part IV A sets out 
in much greater detail the scope and effect of the Australian GAP. 
Essentially the Part gives statutory effect to the predication approach set 
out in Newton, although it does clarify the breadth of the provision's 
effect, otherwise seen to have been problematic under the previous GAP 
for leading to unreasonable results. 178 
Part IV A allows the Commissioner to cancel a tax benefit where it 
has been obtained in connection with a "scheme" to which the Part 
applies. 179 Section 177D in the Australian Act serves the same function 
as section 99(2) and says that Part IV A applies where the relevant 
taxpayer receives a tax benefit "whether or not that person who entered 
into or carried out the scheme or any part of the scheme is the relevant 
taxpayer."' 8° Clearly therefore the Australian general anti-avoidance 
provision does not contemplate the taxpayer involvement of the type the 
courts in BNZI suggested section 99 does. 
The High Court case of Peabody v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation' 8' illustrates the application of Part IV A. The case involved a 
series of complicated transactions undertaken to float a company in a 
tax efficient manner. The Court held that Part IV A applied to Mrs 
Peabody, a non-party taxpayer with apparently limited conscious 
involvement in the scheme attacked. 182 This case illustrates that in 
Australia it need not be the relevant taxpayer's purpose to obtain a tax 
176 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Aus), s 260. 
177 GT Pagone QC ''Tax Planning or Tax Avoidance" (2000) 29 ATR 96, 100. 
178 Pagone, above, 101 and 104. The predication principle was enunciated by the 
Privy Council in Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1958) AC 450, 466 
Denning LJ (PC). 
179 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Aus), s l 77F(l). "Scheme" is defined as 
including an "arrangement" Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Aus), s 177 A. 
180 Notably its focus in determining whether there is a tax avoidance purpose or effect 
is on the persons who made or entered into the scheme. 
181 (1994) 181 CLR 359 (HCA). 
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advantage, it might be that of another person who made or entered into 
the scheme. 183 There is no discussion in the case as to the extent of Mrs 
Peabody's knowledge of or involvement with the scheme, however this 
is quite consistent with the view that taxpayer involvement is not 
relevant when identifying the relevant arrangement. 
Recently the Second Commissioner of the Australian Tax Office 
presented a paper to give practical advice on Part IVA. 184 He referred to 
the Australian revenue department's decision making process which is 
consistent with the argument that the taxpayer need not be a party to the 
arrangement. 185 The first three steps of the process are to identify the 
scheme, identify the tax benefit, and identify the taxpayer to target. 
Step four then assesses whether the person(s) who entered into or 
carried out the scheme did so for the purpose of enabling the relevant 
taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit in connection with the scheme. 186 This 
process confirms that the first step should always be identifying the 
relevant arrangement, and that this should be done without reference to 
the involvement of any taxpayer. 
The express terms of the current Australian GAP are by no means 
analogous to the terms of section 99. Part IV A is set out in significant 
detail in comparison to the broad tem1s of section 99 . However the 
definitions of 'scheme' and 'arrangement' in each of these GAPs are not 
significantly different, and do not on their terms appear to warrant 
different judicial approaches to them in relation to the issue of taxpayer 
participation. The law on which Part IV A is based developed from 
cases decided under GAPs similar in nature to New Zealand's GAP. 
The stated intention in the Explanatory Memorandum to Part IV A was 
that the Part was to encapsulate the approach of Lord Denning in 
182 Peabody v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 181 CLR 359,386 (HCA). 
183 p Harris (2"d Conunissioner) "Australia 's General Anti-avoidance Rule: Part IVA 
Has Some Teeth But Are Some Missing?" [1998] BTR 124, 132. 
184 p Harris (2"ct Commissioner) "Austra lia 's General Anti-avoidance Rule: Part IVA 
Has Some Teeth But Are Some Missing?" [1998] BTR 124. 
185 MD' Ascenzo "A Practical Guide on Part IVA" (2001) 30 ATR 89. 
186 D'Ascenzo, above, 91-92. 
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Newton. 187 In the light of this commonality of background and the 
significant influence of the Newton approach still reflected in both the 
New Zealand and Australian GAPs, there is a persuasive case that the 
New Zealand GAP should be interpreted and applied in a manner 
broadly consistent with Part IV A and the cases decided under it. 188 
9. The Canadian GAP 
Since 1988 Canada has also had a GAP similar to that found in New 
Zealand. 189 The section applies to 'avoidance transactions'. A 
'transaction' is defined in the legislation as including an arrangement or 
event, 190 and an 'avoidance transaction' means any transaction that 
would result in a tax benefit unless the transaction may reasonably be 
considered to have been undertaken or arranged for bone fide business 
purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit. 191 Like the New Zealand 
and Australian GAPs, the Canadian section focuses on the transaction 
and imports no requirement of taxpayer involvement. Where a 
transaction is an avoidance transaction, section 245(2) provides that the 
tax consequences to a person shall be determined as is reasonable in the 
circumstances in order to deny a tax benefit that would result directly or 
indirectly from that transaction. 
To date the Canadian GAP has not been subject to significant 
judicial interpretation. 192 One recent Canadian case however suggests 
that Canadian law will be interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
view that the taxpayer against whom the section is applied need not be a 
participant in the arrangement. Judge Bowie in OSFC Holdings Ltd v 
The Queen said: 193 
187 Commonwealth Department of the Treasury, Australia Income Tax laws 
Amendment Act (No.2) 1981 : Expla11ato1y Memorandum (Australia, 1981). 
188 C Oluns "Part IVA and FCT v Peabody" (1995) 1 NZJTLP 249, 267. 
189 Income Tax Act RSC 1985, s 245. 
190 Income Tax Act RSC 1985, s 245(1). 
19 1 Income Tax Act RSC 1985, s 245(3). 
192 V Krishna QC "The Scope of GAAR" (2000) 10 CCT 1. 
193 [1999] 3 CTC 2649, 2666 (CTC) Bowie TCJ. 
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[s]ubsection (2) is carefully worded to make it clear that the recipient 
of the tax benefit need not be the same person who enters into or 
orchestrates the transaction or series of transactions. 
It is submitted therefore, that to focus on whether or not a 
particular taxpayer is involved or a participant in an arrangement before 
deciding whether an arrangement exists is inconsistent with the words 
and the scheme of section 99. Taxpayer involvement should be by no 
means determinative. Previous New Zealand cases have extended the 
scope of section 99 beyond parties and such an approach is consistent 
with the approaches adopted to this issue in other jurisdictions with 
similar GAPs. 
VII ANALTERNATIVEAPPROACH 
A The Approach 
Given the questions that have been raised in relation to the 
appropriateness of focusing on taxpayer involvement in determining the 
arrangement issue, and bearing in mind Justice McGechan's observation 
that there is wisdom in the approach to the interpretation of tax 
legislation that begins with a consideration of the words in issue, 194 it is 
suggested that there is an alternative interpretation of section 99 under 
which no requirement of taxpayer participation in the relevant 
anangement is read into the section. There are three key steps to this 
alternative approach. 
1. Section 99(1) - is there an arrangement? 
Section 99(1) defines an arrangement for the purposes of section 99. 
Thus before section 99(2) is applied it is important to identify the 
anangement to which it will be applied. This approach differs from that 
adopted by the High Court and the Court of Appeal significantly in that 
no question of taxpayer participation arises. The approach proceeds on 
19~ BNZ Jn vestments Ltd v Commissioner of inland Revenue (2000) 19 NZTC 15,732 , 
15,787 (HC) McGechan J. 
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the basis that just because a certain taxpayer 1s not party to an 
arrangement, does not preclude the existence of an arrangement at all. 
On the facts of BNZI for example the arrangement identified might be 
an arrangement between CML and the offshore entities. As suggested 
above, Ramsay type analysis may be instructive at this stage to assist in 
determining the true scope of the arrangement. 
2. Section 99(2) - is it a tax avoidance arrangement? 
Section 99(2) analysis focuses on the arrangement identified in the 
section 99(1) analysis to determine if it is a tax avoidance arrangement. 
If the arrangement identified does not have the requisite tax avoidance 
purpose or effect then section 99 cannot be invoked to avoid the 
aiTangement. It is in this stage of the analysis that the scope of section 
99 is narrowed. This can be contrasted with the BNZI decisions where a 
significant restriction on the scope of section 99, in the form of the 
taxpayer participation requirement, was effected at the first stage of 
determining whether an arrangement even existed. 
3. Reconstruction 
If the arrangement is a tax avoidance arrangement, section 99(2) makes 
it void for income tax purposes, and section 99(3) can be applied to 
counteract any tax advantage received from or under the arrangement by 
a taxpayer affected by the arrangement. Under this step, taxpayers such 
as BNZI who have been affected by a tax avoidance arrangement may 
be targeted and have their tax advantage counteracted. Once again, no 
question of the participation or involvement of the taxpayer arises. All 
that must be established is a tax advantage obtained from or under a 
void tax avoidance arrangement. 
To apply this analysis to the present facts , one result might be that 
the downstream transactions are found to constitute an arrangement 
between CML and the downstream entities involved for the purposes of 
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section 99(1 ). 195 If that was the arrangement identified, it would then be 
necessary to consider whether it was an arrangement to which section 
99(2) applies. Focusing on the arrangement identified, as contemplated 
by section 99(2), there is an arrangement, made or entered into, with a 
tax avoidance purpose or effect, 196 that has affected BNZI. 197 Under this 
analysis, assuming that the High Court's findings in relation to tax 
avoidance are correct and adopting them for the purposes of argument, 
it would appear that that BNZI do in fact fall within the scope of section 
99 and the Commissioner would be entitled to counteract any tax 
advantage obtained by them from or under the arrangement. 198 
This approach is logical and consistent with the scheme of section 
99. Section 99(2) has the purpose of determining the arrangements to 
which section 99 applies and it is therefore suggested that issues in 
relation to the scope of the GAP would be more logically addressed 
under section 99(2). 
VIII A FLAWED APPROACH? 
Arguably the interpretation advocated above is flawed by virtue of the 
fact that it has the effect of extending section 99's coverage to 
'innocent' taxpayers. It applies section 99 on a straight cause and effect 
basis. 
A driving factor in the High Court's decision to adopt the approach 
that it did was that Parliament would not have intended such an effect of 
section 99. The Court considered that there were "real difficulties in a 
concept which drags a taxpayer within a multi-step arrangement on a 
195 This analysis proceeds on the assumption that the rejection of the sub-scheme 
approach in Case U6 discussed above does not preclude the identification of such an 
arrangement. 
196 Accepting the High Court 's findings in relation to the Alasdair/Fenstanton 
transaction. 
197 Based on the High Court's finding that BNZI obtained a tax advantage from the 
Alasdair/Fenstanton transaction. 
198 Income Tax Act 1976, s 99(3). 
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simple basis of taxpayer knowledge." 199 Justice McGechan said that the 
"perfect innocence no knowledge" situation does not constitute an 
'a1Tangement', and considered that it would be "unfair and disruptive" 
to hold otherwise.200 Similarly, in the Court of Appeal the majority 
were heavily influenced in their decision by the concept of 'equity'. 
They said that: 20 1 
[t]he justification for construing the concept of arrangement in that 
way is that it would be inequitable for a taxpayer who enters into an 
apparently unobjectionable transaction to be deprived of its rights 
thereunder merely because unknown to the taxpayer, the other party 
intended to meet its obligations under that transaction, or in fact did 
so, in a legally objectionable way. 
A Rebuttal 
While these criticisms may correctly refer to the effect such an 
interpretation might have, they are not necessarily valid. 
The words of the section must be remembered. As President 
Cooke has noted "the width and tenor of [ section 99], an enlarged 
version of section 108 of the 197 4 Act, can be underestimated if one 
does not keep its terms in mind prominently."202 The words of the 
section require the analysis to focus on the arrangement and its purpose 
or effect, rather than applying 'to a taxpayer'. It is the alteration of the 
incidence of tax that counts. It is for this reason that it has been said 
that conceptually there is no good reason why the character of a 
transaction should be viewed differently where the tax benefit was an 
unintended benefit or consequence of what was done, for the ultimate 
impact on the revenue, or the incidence of tax would be the same 
199 BNZ fll vestments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2000) 19 NZTC 15,732, 
15,788 (HC) McGechan J. 
200 BNZI v CIR, above, 15 ,788 (HC) McGechan J. 
201 Commiss ioner of Inland Revenue v BNZ Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17, 103, 
17,1 17 (CA) Richardson P. 
202 Had lee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1991) 13 NZTC 8, 116, 8,121 (CA) 
Cooke P. 
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regardless of what the intention of the parties was.
203 The New Zealand 
GAP reflects this conceptual rationale and adopts an objective approach 
whereby tax avoidance is detem1ined by what the transaction effects and 
motive is irrelevant. It is therefore considered irrelevant to explore the 
motivating intention of individual participants and ignorance or even 
infancy is beside the point,204 even though this could lead to inequitable 
results. 
It is also important that the nature of tax avoidance is not confused 
with evasion and other forms of impermissible tax related conduct 
which are prohibited by statute. As Justice Fullagar once noted "[t]he 
word 'avoidance', unlike the word 'evasion', does not, in my opinion, 
involve any notion of active or passive fault on the part of the 
taxpayer."205 Tax avoidance therefore is not concerned with the 'moral 
culpability' of the taxpayer such as is the case with evasion. A taxpayer 
is entitled to mitigate his or her liability to tax. An arrangement may 
however be void as a tax avoidance arrangement, even though the 
arrangement falls squarely within the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 
if it yields a level of income that although 'correct', is a result that 
Parliament did not intend.206 Tax evasion on the other hand involves 
arrangements outside the law in which the liability to tax having been 
incurred, is concealed or ignored.
207 In the case of evasion a taxpayer's 
calculation of income is wrong and there is therefore no need to adjust a 
taxpayer's assessable income under a provision like section 99.
208 
Section 143B of the Tax Administration Act 1994 deals with 
evasion. It provides that evasion is committed where a person 
203 N F Orow "Towards a Conceptually Coherent Theory of Tax Avoidance - Part 2" 
(1995) 1 NZJTLP 307, 316-317. 
204 With ey v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1998) 18 NZTC 13,606, 13,609 (HC) 
Baragwanath J. 
205 Australian Jam Co Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1953] ALR 855 , 
861. 
206 Corrunittee of Experts on Tax Compliance Tax Compliance - Report to the 
Treasurer and Minister of Revenue (Wellington, December 1998) 119. 
207 2001 New Zealand Master Tax Guide (2001 , CCH New Zealand Ltd, Auckland) 
1098. 
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knowingly does, or omits to do, one of a number of specified acts such 
as withholding information, and intends to evade the assessment or 
payment of tax by themselves or another, or to obtain a refund or 
payment of tax that they or the other person is not legally entitled.
209 A 
breach of this section can result in a criminal penalty.
210 
Conceptually therefore there is a distinction between tax 
avoidance, the focus of which is on the arrangement and the alteration 
of the incidence of tax, and evasion and other knowledge offences, the 
focus of which is on the state of mind of the taxpayer who did or did not 
do certain acts . 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that, as discussed above,
2 11 the 
courts in Australia and Canada, which have comparable GAPs to New 
Zealand and whose GAPs extend to taxpayers who are not involved in 
an arrangement, have not felt that it is necessary to read into their GAPs 
a threshold requirement of taxpayer involvement in an arrangement in 
order to prevent inequitable results. In fact, although the current 
Australian GAP sought to address problematic issues of the uncertainty 
of the scope of the previous Australian GAP,
2 12 in drafting Part IVA the 
Australian legislature did not seek to do so by restricting the definition 
of scheme. To the contrary the definition of scheme was extended to 
include unilateral arrangements. 
Read literally, it has been shown that section 99 does not require 
an examination of the extent of a taxpayer's knowledge, involvement or 
culpability in relation to an arrangement. Thus while one might 
therefore question their relevance in this context, nevertheless it may be 
208 J Prebble "Criminal Law, Tax Evasion, Shams and Tax Avoidance: Part l -Tax 
Evasion and General Doctrines of Criminal Law" (1996) 2 NZJTLP 3, 5. 
209 The Tax Administration Act 1994, section 143A also provides that a criminal 
offence is committed where a person knowingly does or omits to do a number of other 
specified acts set out. 
210 The Tax Administration Act also provides for civil penalties for evasion and other 
knowledge offences: Tax Administration Act 1994 s 141E. 
2 11 See Part VIC 8 The Australian GAP and Part VI C 9 The Canadian GAP. 
2 12 Commonwealth Department of the Treasury, Australia Income Tax Laws 
Amendment Act (No.2) 1981: Explanatory Memorandum (Australia, 1981). 
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that in order to reach a workable approach to section 99, it is necessary 
to concede, as the Commissioner did, that there is appeal in an 
interpretation of the section which would not apply to innocent 
taxpayers on a straight cause and effect basis.
21 3 
'Innocence' as discussed here, it should be noted, is used in a 
broad sense and refers to taxpayers such as the consumer in the 
following example used in the BNZI case: 
A car dealer is involved in a tax avoidance arrangement. As a result 
of this he sells a car more cheaply than he otherwise would have to a 
consumer. 
It seems unlikely that Parliament would have intended that the 
Commissioner could apply section 99 to the consumer by virtue of the 
fact that they had been affected by a tax avoidance arrangement. In the 
BNZI case although the Commissioner conceded that an approach with 
such an effect would not be desirable, he submitted that BNZI were not 
in a position of innocence, and therefore his submissions did not address 
in detail means of preventing such an effect in the approaches he argued 
should be adopted.
2 14 
IX LIMITING THE SCOPE OF SECTION 99 
A Limits on the Face of the Section 
Section 99 contains a number of limits within its terms. The two main 
limits are that of an arrangement and a tax avoidance purpose or effect. 
Another is that the Commissioner's ability to reconstruct under section 
99(3) is limited to the extent of the tax advantage obtained by the 
taxpayer from or under the arrangement. The meaning of 'tax 
advantage' was addressed by Justice McGechan in BNZI He accepted 
that a tax advantage was not the same as an economic advantage. 
However, he held that in BNZI the downstream tax avoidance 
213 BNZ Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2000) 19 NZTC 15,732, 
15 ,785 (HC) McGechan J. 
2 14 BNZiv CIR, above, 15,785-15,786 (HC) McGechan J. 
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arrangement enabled CML to pay a higher tax free dividend to BNZI 
than would otherwise have been possible. The extra amount was 
accordingly an indirect tax advantage.
2 15 
A further limit on the scope of the section is the relationship 
between section 99(1) and 99(2). Sometimes a transaction may form 
part of a broader arrangement and therefore related transactions such as 
BNZI's RPS deal may sometimes fall within the ambit of a tax 
avoidance transaction. This does not however necessarily mean that the 
Commissioner will automatically attempt to define arrangements as 
broadly as possible to claw back as much of the tax advantage generated 
as possible. The reason for this is that, as discussed above in relation to 
the sub-scheme approach, just as it is generally easier to establish this 
purpose or effect if the arrangement is identified narrowly; it is likely to 
be more difficult to establish it for a broader arrangement. In effect 
therefore there is a trade off for the Commissioner who will generally 
seek to define the arrangement as narrowly as possible, and this should 
serve as protection for taxpayers. 
B Possible Glosses to Limit the Scope of Section 99 
In the past the courts have read glosses into section 99 to ensure its 
workability. Two possible limiting glosses are discussed below. 
I . Limit based on section 99(1) 'arrangement ' 
The limit adopted by the High Court and the Court of Appeal was to 
limit the scope of section 99 by increasing the threshold at the section 
99(1) arrangement stage to require that the taxpayer be in some way 
involved in the arrangement as a matter of law. While this approach 
may be effective in limiting the section's scope, as has been discussed, 
such a limit leads to inconsistencies between the effect of the section as 
applied and the words of the section. This approach raises the 
threshold requirement of the section by nan·owing the concept of 
215 BNZI v CIR, above, 15 ,8 15-1 5,8 16 (HC) McGechan J. 
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'arrangement', something which had been defined very broadly. From a 
logical point of view the approach is also difficult to reconcile, for it 
seems problematic to say that just because a particular taxpayer is not 
involved in an arrangement, no arrangement exists at all. If such a limit 
is to be adopted, as suggested above,
216 it is more appropriate that 
taxpayer involvement be considered as a matter of fact and degree, 
rather than as a matter oflaw. 
2. Limit based on section 99(2) 'affected by' 
The alternative approach to the application of section 99 can be varied 
by reading a gloss into section 99. Section 99(3) allows the assessable 
income of a taxpayer 'affected' by a tax avoidance arrangement to be 
reconstructed so as to counteract any tax advantage obtained from or 
under it. It is this section that would most readily be applied to a party 
such as BNZI, who although not directly involved in the tax avoidance 
arrangement, have been affected by it through their receipt of a tax 
advantage. A gloss could be read into this section that the effect on the 
taxpayer affected be one that was more than an incidental effect of the 
arrangement, to be determined as a matter of fact and degree. This 
would address the criticism that the alternative approach applies on a 
straight cause and effect basis, by limiting the applicability of section 99 
to ' innocent' taxpayers. 
Applying such an approach to the facts of BNZI, the tax benefit 
could be counteracted, because although the taxpayer had limited 
knowledge of the arrangement, a dominant effect of the arrangement 
was that BNZI received a higher tax free dividend. That this effect was 
more than a merely incidental effect in the nature of a side effect is 
illustrated by the fact that there was an agreement that 50% of the tax 
saving generated would be passed to BNZI. In the car buyer example, 
on the limited facts set out it is unlikely that the effect on the car buyer 
would be more than a merely incidental effect of the arrangement. It is 
216 See section VI B 2 Matter of fact and degree or matter of law? 
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likely that the arrangement would have been set up in such a manner 
that the vendor received the tax benefits, in contrast to the structure in 
BNZI where the tax saving was designed to be shared. Whether the 
effect was more than merely incidental would however be a matter of 
fact and degree to be dete1mined in light of all the facts. 
This gloss is a preferable means of limiting section 99. It is 
consistent with the words and scheme of section 99. It maintains an 
objective approach, the focus of which is on the arrangement identified 
and its effect. Conceptually it is consistent with the notion that where 
an arrangement is a tax avoidance arrangement and the incidence of tax 
is altered, the motives and knowledge of individuals should not be 
considered, since the effect of the arrangement is still the same. It does 
however provide a means by which to draw a line to break a simple 
chain of cause and effect. Pragmatically it is also sound, for it 
recognises that in most instances someone benefiting from a tax 
avoidance arrangement such as BNZI will not be completely innocent, 
even though they may have limited knowledge of the tax avoidance 
steps and transactions that create the tax advantage. Often, as was the 
case in BNZI, promoters of tax driven schemes are careful to ensure that 
those who invest in them are not privy to the intricacies of how the tax 
savings are generated. 
X CONCLUSION 
An arrangement is a concept fundamental to the operation of section 99. 
Without one the section cannot come into force. When an arrangement 
is identified, the question of tax avoidance purpose or effect must be 
established by reference to that arrangement. Given its fundamental 
nature, the lack of litigation or judicial consideration of the scope of this 
broad concept is surprising. The reason for this is perhaps that typically 
tax avoidance cases have focused predominantly on whether an 
accepted arrangement is a tax avoidance arrangement for the purposes 
of reassessing the income of a taxpayer clearly involved in the 
arrangement. 
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This paper has discussed the concept of an arrangement under 
section 99, and in doing so has made particular reference to the facts 
and issues that arose in the BNZJ case. The legislative history of the 
definition of an arrangement and judicial discussion of the concept of an 
arrangement have been outlined. This discussion of the context from 
which the definition of arrangement emerged provided an insight into 
the meaning of the words found in the definition. It was accepted that 
the words 'contract, agreement, plan or understanding' found in the 
definition import the need for a degree of consensus between parties. 
However, consensus is just one aspect of the definition of arrangement, 
and this paper has suggested that the BNZI RPS transactions could 
arguably fall within the scope of an arrangement by virtue of the fact 
that they were a step or transaction by which the downstream tax 
avoidance transactions were caiTied into effect, or alternatively because 
the RPS transactions comprised part of a broader interrelated 
arrangement which also encompassed the downstream tax avoidance 
transactions. 
Having discussed whether it was possible to identify an 
arrangement which encompassed the RPS transactions for the purposes 
of section 99, the paper went on to question whether it was actually 
necessary to do so in order to reassess a tax advantage obtained by a 
taxpayer from or under a tax avoidance arrangement. It did so by 
questioning the fundamental assumption common to both the decision 
of the High Court and the majority of the Court of Appeal in BNZJ that 
for section 99 to be applied to a taxpayer, the particular taxpayer must, 
as a matter of law, have had some degree of knowledge of or 
involvement in the tax avoidance arrangement. It was suggested that, 
while typically a taxpayer who receives a tax advantage from or under 
an arrangement will have the level of involvement the New Zealand 
courts suggested was required, such involvement should not be 
determinative of whether or not an arrangement exists for the purposes 
of section 99. It was demonstrated that to make such a factor 
determinative is not only inconsistent with the words and scheme of 
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section 99, but also with the decisions of Ne\\' Zealand courts. In 
addition, reference , as made to the legislation and approach of the 
cotuis in other jurisdictions with GAPs similar to that found in ew 
Zealand, here no requirement of ta"Xpa er inYOl\'ement is found. 
An alternative approach to section 99 ,, as suggested, the focus of 
which is on the arrangement and which imports no requirement of 
taxpayer involvement, rather requiring only that the taxpayer be affected 
by the arrangement in question. It was acknowledged that this approach 
is open to the criticism that it may lead to the application of section 99 
against 'innocent' taxpayers. This was the justification of the ew 
Zealand courts in adopting the approach they did in B ZI. The alidity 
of this criticism was questioned, and the paper went on to demonstrate 
that even if one accepts this justification as valid, the solution adopted 
by the New Zealand courts was by no means the only way, or in fact the 
preferred way such a problem could be overcome. 
In BNZI, opinion within the Court of Appeal was divided in 
relation to the impact that the restrictive approach adopted by the Court 
to the threshold issue of arrangement would be likely to have. The 
Commissioner contended that the approach of the majority of the Court 
would enable promoters of tax avoidance structures to insulate their 
customers from the tax avoidance arrangement by ensuring that they 
remain ignorant of the mechanism to be used to obtain the tax 
advantage. Justice Blanchard considered this concern to be unrealistic 
and exaggerated. 217 He felt that taxpayers would be unwilling to part 
with large sums of money and to incur the risks associated with 
obtaining a tax advantage without their advisers first gaining a sufficient 
understanding of what was to occur in a tax-driven scheme.
218 
However, Justice Thomas considered that there was force in the 
Commissioner's argument, 21 9 and that Justice Blanchard had "seriously 
2 17 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v BNZ Investments ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,103, 
17,142 (CA) Blanchard J. 
218 CIR v BNZJ, above, 17,143 (CA) Blanchard J. 
219 CIR v ENZ/, above, 17,139 (CA) Thomas J dissenting. 
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[ under-estimated] the ingenuity of the tax avoidance industry."220 He 
felt that it would be nai"ve to assume taxpayers would not adopt a tax-
driven scheme where they have limited knowledge of the tax avoidance 
mechanism to be used. 22 1 
The facts of BNZI are an illustration of the fact that Justice 
Blanchard's assumptions as to the behaviour of taxpayers may not be 
entirely valid, and suggest that the Commissioner's contention may not 
be as unrealistic and exaggerated as Justice Blanchard suggests. Indeed 
the decision in BNZI is also illustrative of the fact that the restrictive 
approach adopted by the New Zealand courts to the arrangement issue 
in section 99 does provide the promoters of tax-driven schemes with a 
degree of scope to shelter not only their clients' income from taxation, 
but also their clients from the scope of the general anti-avoidance 
prov1s1on. 
22° CIR v ENZ!, above, 17, 139 (CA) Thomas J dissenting. 
221 CIR v ENZ!, above, 17, 139 (CA) Thomas J dissenting. 
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